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I.

INTRODUCTION

The experiment with unpublication of federal appellate cases has failed.
The constitutionality of declaring certain cases to be outside the body of
precedent has never been addressed by a rulemaking body or determined by
the United States Supreme Court, but cases seeking such a constitutional
ruling should be brought. The history of our judicial system and the
unfairness of the unpublication system suggest that the process of stripping
precedential status from some decisions is not constitutional. Moreover,
several Supreme Court Justices have expressed concern about the
unpublication system or support for the historical perspective that precedent is
integral to judicial power under the Constitution. Together, these things make
the issue ripe for review.
The practice of issuing some federal appellate court opinions as
unpublished, uncitable, and unprecedential was instituted in the mid-1970s
following an influential report by the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice‘s
Committee on Use of Appellate Court Energies (the 1973 Committee). 1 The
practice of issuing opinions in this manner, referred to throughout this Article
as the ―unpublication system,‖ was launched without addressing the
jurisprudential implications of declaring some common law decisions to be
nonprecedent.2 The authors of the unpublication system viewed the task of
justifying the denial of precedential status to some opinions as ―a morass of
1. The Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, Committee on Use of Appellate Court Energies,
(the 1973 Committee) drafted a report, Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions: A Report of
the Committee on Use of Appellate Energies of the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, which
forms the basis for the present federal unpublication system. In that report, the 1973 Committee
proposed issuing some decisions as unpublished and uncitable. When faced with the question of
whether this new class of decisions would be precedent, it chose not to examine the issue, its
constitutionality, or its practicality, calling it a ―morass of jurisprudence.‖ This unexamined,
unjustified change to the common law system must be addressed. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
APPELLATE JUSTICE, COMM. ON USE OF APP. CT. ENERGIES, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF
JUDICIAL OPINIONS: A REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON USE OF APPELLATE ENERGIES OF THE
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE (1973) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION].
2. Id. at 20.
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jurisprudence‖ and avoided it entirely.3 Now that these formerly unworthy
opinions are both widely published 4 and freely citable, 5 only the third
alteration to the status of these opinions remains: they are not precedent. This
is the most problematic and least justified of the three changes suggested by
the 1973 Committee.
As a way to reduce the federal judicial workload and reduce case
archiving and researching costs, the 1973 Committee decided that some cases
that did not make new law could be issued as unpublished. 6 To ensure that
there was no market for such opinions, it was decided to prevent citation to
them. 7 Finally, the Committee considered what precedential status this new
class of unpublished, uncitable opinions would have. 8 It understood that it
would be best for the system if these decisions were unprecedential, but it also
understood that proclaiming them to be so was problematic. 9 The Committee
shrewdly refrained from denying that unpublished opinions were precedent.
Instead, it took a position that ―relies on the correspondence of publication
and precedential value on the one hand, and of non-publication and nonprecedential value on the other.‖10 That is, if the practicing bar and public
cannot see the opinions, then they cannot use them as precedent—a sort of
judicial out of sight, out of mind. Unfortunately, the number of federal
appellate decisions rendered as ―unpublished‖ has risen to over 84%. 11 The
―correspondence‖ anticipated by the Committee has failed, despite rising rates
of unpublished decisions. Lawyers and judges do value such cases, to the
extent that they are now fully published and freely citable.
This correspondence upon which the Committee relied has unraveled
almost entirely. It has been undermined by changes in technology, persistent
practice by the federal bar and federal judiciary, and the new Federal Rule of
3. Id.
4. Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C. L. REV. 705, 709–10 (2006); Kirt Shuldberg, Digital Influence:
Technology and Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CAL. L. REV. 541, 551
(1997). See generally E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899,
2913 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006)); WEST‘S FEDERAL APPENDIX.
5. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
6. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 1, at 5, 12.
7. Id. at 18–20. The fact that such a limitation was necessary signals that these cases do make
new law by expanding, contracting, or simply applying existing standards, which belies the error in
the entire premise of the scheme.
8. Id. at 18.
9. Id. at 18–19.
10. Id. at 21.
11. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 52
tbl.S-3 (2006) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/
tables/s3.pdf (showing the percentage unpublished in the twelve-month period ending September 30,
2006, to be 84.1%).
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Appellate Procedure 32.1. Though still labeled ―unpublished opinions,‖ these
opinions are published, not only online but also in printed volumes such as the
West‘s Federal Appendix. This is in large part due to the continuous use of
these opinions by practitioners and judges—despite the opinions‘ citation or
precedential status.12 Finally, the new Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
allows citations of all opinions (albeit prospectively). 13 These opinions are
now effectively published and plainly citable. The only remaining feature of
the 1970s unpublication system is the fundamental jurisprudential impact of
removing cases from the body of precedent—the most important feature of
the system, but also the one with unexamined justifications. This should be
examined and the precedential status of these opinions acknowledged.
The Supreme Court has referred to the issue of unpublished opinions only
in passing, and it has never taken on the question directly, either on a petition
for certiorari or as part of its rulemaking authority. It has been presented the
issue directly as part of petitions for certiorari more than thirty times 14 but has
12. David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning Precedential
Status to All Opinions, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61, 166–73 (forthcoming 2009).
13. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
14. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Untracht v. Fikri, 128 S. Ct. 1666 (2008) (No. 07-932), 2008
WL 154432 [hereinafter Untracht Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Spiegel v. Volvo Cars N.
Am., L.L.C., 128 S. Ct. 911 (2008) (No. 07-573), 2007 WL 3225519 [hereinafter Spiegel Petition];
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 128 S. Ct. 669 (2007) (No. 07-453), 2007
WL 2890417 [hereinafter Canatella Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Family Fare, Inc. v.
NLRB, 127 S. Ct. 2991 (2007) (No. 06-1536), 2007 WL 1481871 [hereinafter Family Fare Petition];
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Wheeler v. Mo. Dir. of Revenue, 549 U.S. 1266 (2007) (No. 06-1054),
2007 WL 275948 [hereinafter Wheeler Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Stilley v.
Marschewski, 549 U.S. 1112 (2007) (No. 06-520), 2006 WL 2966557 [hereinafter Stilley Petition];
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Shefchuk v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 549 U.S. 952 (2006) (No. 05-1384),
2006 WL 1151375 [hereinafter Shefchuk Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, N. Pacifica L.L.C.
v. City of Pacifica, 546 U.S. 1138 (2006) (No. 05-604), 2005 WL 3067191 [hereinafter N. Pacifica
Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Heavrin v. Schilling, 546 U.S. 1137 (2006) (No. 05-508),
2005 WL 2708404 [hereinafter Heavrin Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, O.S.C. Co. v.
Zymblosky, 546 U.S. 936 (2005) (No. 05-156), 2005 WL 1811046 [hereinafter O.S.C. Petition I];
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, O.S.C. Co., 546 U.S. 936 (No. 05-156), 2005 WL 1811047
[hereinafter O.S.C. Petition II]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rana v. United States, 546 U.S. 877
(2005) (No. 05-255), 2005 WL 2055899 [hereinafter Rana Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Seils v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 544 U.S. 920 (2005) (No. 04-807), 2004 WL 2912787 [hereinafter
Seils Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 543 U.S. 819 (2004)
(No. 03-1678), 2004 WL 1400165 [hereinafter Zimmerman Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Schmier v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 543 U.S. 818 (2004) (No. 03-1660), 2004 WL 1369162 [hereinafter
Schmier III Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rodriguez v. HFP, Inc., 541 U.S. 903 (2004)
(No. 03-971), 2004 WL 50121 [hereinafter Rodriguez Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Carey
v. Knox County, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004) (No. 03-770), 2003 WL 22867741 [hereinafter Carey
Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Reply Brief, Test v. Comm‘r, 538 U.S. 961 (2003) (No. 021170), 2003 WL 21698680 [hereinafter Test Reply Brief]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Martin v.
KeyCorp, 538 U.S. 961 (2003) (No. 02-1150), 2003 WL 21698636 [hereinafter Martin Petition];
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Berrafato v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 537 U.S.
1233 (2003) (No. 02-1015), 2002 WL 32133835 [hereinafter Berrafato Petition]; Petition for Writ of
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denied all but one request.15 Even in that one case, the Court ultimately
decided the case without reference to the unpublication system. 16 Individual
Justices have commented in professional writings, interviews, speeches,
concurring and dissenting opinions, and similar venues about the
unpublication system in ways that may provide clues to the Court‘s
willingness to rule on the issue. The citadel of unpublication is falling, 17 and
while it is by no means clear, there is at least some evidence to suggest that
the Supreme Court may help with, or at least approve of, the demolition.

Certiorari, S. Clay Prods., Inc. v. United Catalysts, Inc., 537 U.S. 1189 (2003) (No. 02-848), 2002
WL 32133762 [hereinafter S. Clay Prods. Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lewin v. Cooke,
537 U.S. 881 (2002) (No. 02-49), 2002 WL 32134165 [hereinafter Lewin Petition]; Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Lemelson Med. v. Symbol Techs., 537 U.S. 825 (2002) (No. 01-1855), 2002 WL
32135953 [hereinafter Lemelson Med. Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Alcan Aluminum
Corp. v. Prudential Assurance Co., 536 U.S. 959 (2002) (No. 01-1594), 2002 WL 32135303
[hereinafter Alcan Aluminum Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Wendt v. Mineta, 536 U.S.
941 (2002) (No. 01-1613), 2002 WL 32135384 [hereinafter Wendt Petition]; Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Mims v. United States, 534 U.S. 1132 (2002) (No. 01-862), 2001 WL 34117254
[hereinafter Mims Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pappas v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 534 U.S.
1129 (2002) (No. 01-772), 2001 WL 34117413 [hereinafter Pappas Petition]; Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Segal v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 534 U.S. 1041 (2001) (No. 01-494), 2001 WL
34115636 [hereinafter Segal Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bostron v. Massanari, 534 U.S.
896 (2001) (No. 01-290), 2001 WL 34116247 [hereinafter Bostron Petition]; Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Knight v. Maleng, 534 U.S. 820 (2001) (No. 00-1808), 2001 WL 34125170 [hereinafter
Knight Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Smyly v. IBM, 528 U.S. 982 (1999) (No. 99-367),
1999 WL 33639987 [hereinafter Smyly Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Schmier v.
Jennings, 522 U.S. 1149 (1998) (No. 97-1206), 1998 WL 34112160 [hereinafter Schmier II Petition];
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Culp v. Hood, 519 U.S. 1042 (1996) (No. 96-696), 1996 WL
33421950 [hereinafter Culp Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Litton Sys., Inc. v. Carroll, 516
U.S. 816 (1995) (No. 94-1989), 1995 WL 17050077 [hereinafter Litton Sys. Petition]; Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Friedman v. Montgomery County, 489 U.S. 1079 (1989) (No. 88-1190), 1988 WL
1093420 [hereinafter Friedman Petition]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Van Sant v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 475 U.S. 1082, reh’g denied, 476 U.S. 1131 (1986) (No. 85-1096), 1985 WL 695444
[hereinafter Van Sant Petition]; Do-Right Auto Sales v. U.S. Ct. of App. for 7th Cir., 429 U.S. 917
(1976).
15. Untracht, 128 S. Ct. 1666; Spiegel, 128 S. Ct. 911; Canatella, 128 S. Ct. 669; Family Fare,
127 S. Ct. 2991; Wheeler, 549 U.S. 1266; Stilley, 549 U.S. 1112; Shefchuk, 549 U.S. 952; N. Pacifica
L.L.C., 546 U.S. 1138; Heavrin, 546 U.S. 1137; O.S.C. Co., 546 U.S. 936; Rana, 546 U.S. 877; Seils,
544 U.S. 920; Zimmerman, 543 U.S. 819; Schmier, 543 U.S. 818; Rodriguez, 541 U.S. 903; Carey,
540 U.S. 1218; Test, 538 U.S. 961; Martin, 538 U.S. 961; Berrafato, 537 U.S. 1233; S. Clay Prods.,
Inc., 537 U.S. 1189; Lewin, 537 U.S. 881; Lemelson Med., 537 U.S. 825; Alcan Aluminum Corp.,
536 U.S. 959; Wendt, 536 U.S. 941; Mims, 534 U.S. 1132; Pappas, 534 U.S. 1129; Segal, 534 U.S.
1041; Bostron, 534 U.S. 896; Knight, 534 U.S. 820; Smyly, 528 U.S. 982; Schmier, 522 U.S. 1149;
Culp, 519 U.S. 1042; Litton Sys., Inc., 516 U.S. 816; Friedman, 489 U.S. 1079; Van Sant, 475 U.S.
1082; Do-Right Auto Sales, 429 U.S. 917.
16. Browder v. Dir., Dep‘t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 258 n.1 (1978).
17. See Stephen R. Barnett, No-Citation Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report and Analysis,
5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 473, 473 (2003) (referencing Judge Cardozo‘s famous phrase in
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931), that ―[t]he assault upon the citadel of
privity [was] proceeding . . . apace‖ to make a similar claim regarding no-citation rules).
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This Article will address this issue in four parts. First, it will examine,
briefly, the history of publication and precedent. Second, it will set forth the
constitutional infirmities in denying the precedential value of some decisions.
Third, it will discuss the Supreme Court‘s treatment of challenges to the
unpublication system. Finally, it will examine the statements of current
Supreme Court Justices in separate opinions, scholarship, and media
comments on the issue of unpublication system and precedent. 18
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF PUBLICATION AND PRECEDENT
Throughout English and American history, the publication status of an
opinion was not directly determinative of its precedential value. That is,
while it may have been difficult for litigants to find a court‘s past decisions,
nothing prevented a litigant from bringing such a decision to the court‘s
attention or suggesting that the court need not follow it.19 The 1973
Committee set in motion an odd distinction that had not been present in
common law in England or America. On its face, the Committee‘s
recommendation claims to deal with only whether an unpublished case can be
18. This Article focuses on the potential for Supreme Court review rather than on its potential
rulemaking. The Supreme Court has the authority to change the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure (FRAP) to clarify the precedential status of all opinions. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2071–2077 (2006). It is unclear whether an addition to FRAP 32.1 recognizing the precedential
value of all opinions would take as long to approve as FRAP 32.1 did, or whether, given the
unraveling of the unpublication system, such a change would be more quickly adopted. What is clear
is that a change to the rule would be easy to draft technically by adding a part (c): ―(c) The
precedential value of any opinion, order, judgment, or written disposition shall not be affected by its
designation as ‗unpublished,‘ ‗not for publication,‘ ‗non-precedential,‘ ‗not precedent,‘ or the like.‖
This language tracks that already in FRAP 32.1 for similar concepts. Some believe that the Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules ought to have included a more meaningful statement about precedent
in FRAP 32.1, while others question whether the Rules Enabling Act would allow such a substantive
issue to be addressed by rule. Compare Ununpublished, 7 GREEN BAG 105, 107 (2004)
(―Reasonable minds differ about whether the constitution does, or sound public policy should, permit
courts to limit the use and legal force of unpublished opinions. It‘s too bad the Advisory Committee
has done next to nothing to address those differences. Most judges give better reasons for their
decisions—at least in their published opinions.‖) with Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little:
Explaining the Sturm Und Drang Over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1429, 1484 n.273 (2005) (―A rule that prescribed the legal force that must be accorded
unpublished opinions would likely ‗abridge, enlarge or modify‘ the ‗substantive right[s]‘ of the
parties and thus proposing such a rule is likely beyond the authority provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)
(2000).‖). The decision of the Advisory Committee to avoid the issue of precedent is an
understandable, if regrettable, one. But the idea that the circuits may deny the precedential status of
some opinions by rule but the Supreme Court may not acknowledge the precedential status of all
opinions makes little sense. If recognizing that all decisions have precedential value enlarges
substantive rights, then surely denying precedential value to some decisions reduces those rights.
19. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 204 (3d ed. 1990) (Even
in the earliest days of reporting cases, ―[t]he rolls continued to be the most authoritative source of
precedents into later times, and it was common for counsel to ‗vouch the record‘ when citing a
previous case.‖).
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cited as precedent and not whether it is precedent.20 This is a distinction
without a difference. The 1973 Committee plainly understood that removing
a decision from publication and citation very effectively removed it from the
body of precedent as well as from view. In fact, it relied on this
―correspondence of publication and precedential value on the one hand, and of
non-publication and non-precedential value on the other,‖21 to avoid
examining the precedent issue in greater detail. A brief examination of the
history of common law demonstrates the centrality of precedent to that
system. 22 While there may be normative arguments about the desirability of a
common law system, it is readily apparent that we have historically had one.
As a cornerstone of the common law system, this central notion of precedent
has survived the unpublication system, unraveled that system, and now waits
to be reacknowledged.
A. Early England
The origins of modern common law and modern notions of legal
precedent are typically traced to England under the reign of Henry II in the
latter half of the twelfth century. 23 Henry II united England under a common
system of laws and, as a contemporary legal treatise indicates, a coherent
system of law involving both a central court and itinerant (circuit) court
judges.24 The result of this more fixed system was a professional bar and
system of law so important that the arguments of members of the bar and the
court itself were being recorded in books. 25 Once recorded, these arguments
and the decisions of the court served as tools for the learning of the law,
navigation of the court system by practitioners, and an aid to consistency in
decision-making by courts.
After the first century under this budding system, famed jurist Henry de
Bracton explained the principles and procedures of English law through a
collection of cases (the Note Book) and an accompanying treatise (Treatise on
the Laws of England) commonly referred to simply as Bracton.26 Bracton‘s
treatise indicated existing reliance upon prior cases and aided future

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 1, at 18–19.
Id. at 21.
A more lengthy recitation can be found in Cleveland, supra note 12, at 69–84.
BAKER, supra note 19, at 15.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
HENRY DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE (ON THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND) (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1968) (1569); see also BAKER, supra note 19, at 201–02; JAMES W. TUBBS, THE COMMON LAW
MIND: MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS 7–20 (2000).
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development of the concept of precedent.27 By the latter half of the thirteenth
century, records of the arguments and decisions, in ―the very words of judges
and pleaders,‖ were being kept.28 Yearbooks from the period reveal that both
counsel and the court cited to prior decisions and openly acknowledged that
their decisions would be viewed as precedent in later cases. 29 Early precedent
was not limited to published accounts. By the sixteenth century, England had
a number of case reports, including Plowden‘s Commentaries and Bulstrode‘s
careful reporting of the decisions of the King‘s Bench, 30 but the most
influential of these was Sir Edward Coke‘s thirteen-volume treatise of past
cases, typically referred to as The Reports.31 Sir Coke‘s volumes were wellknown, likely due to his comprehensiveness, style, and personal
accomplishments. 32 Coke cited to both ancient and recent precedent and
perceived precedent to be the center of the judicial exercise. 33 Coke viewed
refinement of the law through repeated application as an important element of
the common law. 34
By the latter half of the eighteenth century there was a greater adherence
to the dictates of precedent; a major proponent of this trend was Sir William
Blackstone. 35 Blackstone perceived the adherence to precedent as the
generally applicable rule and judicial discretion to ignore precedent as the
exception—an exception that was limited to instances where the precedent
was ―manifestly absurd or unjust‖ or ―contrary to reason.‖36 The effect of
precedent as Blackstone perceived it became central to English jurisprudence:
27. BRYCE LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 435–36
(2d ed. 1980).
28. BAKER, supra note 19, at 225.
29. Id. For example, one case reveals a judge, perhaps speaking directly to a case reporter,
saying regarding his decision that ―one may safely put that in his book for law.‖ Id. (citing Midhope
v. Prior of Kirkham, 36 S.S. 178 (1313)).
30. Id. at 210.
31. Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43, 62
(2001); Anika C. Stucky, Comment, Building Law, Not Libraries: The Value of Unpublished
Opinions and Their Effects on Precedent, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 403, 412–13 (2006).
32. Stucky, supra note 31, at 413.
33. Id.
34. Healy, supra note 31, at 66 (citing JOHN GREVILLE AGARD P OCOCK, THE ANCIENT
CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 35 (1987)); H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern
Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1536–37 & n.91 (1987) (book
review). Coke‘s idealistic vision of improving the law itself through accumulation of applications of
the law should be realized in modern common law systems. We possess the ability to record both
arguments and decisions with greater certainty, to retain those records more permanently, and to
disseminate the decisions to a wider audience. More applications of the principles of law to facts,
such that those principles are tested and refined, improve our understanding of those principles and
give greater certainty to those seeking to conform their conduct to them.
35. Healey, supra note 31, at 70.
36. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69–70.
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By the beginning of the nineteenth century, courts began to
regard a line of decisions as absolutely binding, though they
could still depart from a single decision, or even two
decisions, for sufficient reasons. Gradually that exception
also disappeared and by the latter half of the nineteenth
century, courts asserted an obligation to follow all prior cases,
no matter how incorrect. Even the House of Lords, which had
never regarded its own precedents as binding, declared in
1861 that it was absolutely bound by its past decisions. 37
Blackstone‘s ideas of precedent and common law are well-documented in
his Commentaries on the Laws of England and were extremely influential in
both England and America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries.38 Indeed, Blackstone‘s Commentaries were influential in the early
development of the United States legal system, which imported the common
law system, with its notions of precedent.39
B. Early United States
―American courts have always adhered to a common law system that is
dependent upon precedent.‖40 America‘s41 courts were varied during the
founding and have changed since then, but their implicit reliance on inherited
ideas about the law is difficult to deny. As Justice Story explained:
The case is not alone considered as decided and settled; but
the principles of the decision are held, as precedents and
37. Healy, supra note 31, at 72.
38. William S. Brewbaker III, Found Law, Made Law and Creation: Reconsidering
Blackstone’s Declaratory Theory, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 255, 255 (2007) (―Sir William Blackstone‘s
Commentaries on the Laws of England is arguably the single most influential work of jurisprudence
in American history.‖); Herbert J. Storing, William Blackstone, in HISTORY OF P OLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 622–34 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987); see also Albert W.
Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996); Harold J. Berman & Charles J.
Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J.
437, 489–96 (1996); Rupert Cross, Blackstone v. Bentham, 92 L.Q. REV. 516, 516 (1976); S.F.C.
Milsom, The Nature of Blackstone’s Achievement, 1 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1981); Wilfrid
Prest, Blackstone as Architect: Constructing the Commentaries, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 103, 108
(2003).
39. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 78–80.
40. Suzanne O. Snowden, “That’s My Holding and I’m Not Sticking To It!” Court Rules That
Deprive Unpublished Opinions of Precedential Authority Distort the Common Law, 79 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1253, 1256 (2001).
41. The use of ―America‖ throughout this Article refers, of course, to the United States of
America, not to the Americas at large. Hopefully, the meaning is clear, and the connotation is that
the author is succinct, not that he is provincial.
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authority, to bind future cases of the same nature. This is the
constant practice under our whole system of jurisprudence.
Our ancestors brought it with them, when they first emigrated
to this country; and it is, and always has been considered, as
the great security of our rights, our liberties, and our property.
It is on this account, that our law is justly deemed certain, and
founded in permanent principles, and not dependent upon the
caprice, or will of particular judges.42
Blackstone‘s Commentaries and his ideas about precedent were as
resonant with American lawyers as they were with English lawyers: ―[t]he
Commentaries became the chief if not the only law books in every lawyer‘s
office, and the most important if not the only textbook for law students.‖ 43
Many scholars have noted the profound effect of Blackstone‘s common law
scholarship on the thinking of both the revolutionary and founding
generations of America.44 Blackstone‘s Commentaries have been described
as the principal source of legal education of Alexander Hamilton45 and an
awe-inducing inspiration to the young James Kent.46
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Blackstone‘s
philosophy was married with increased reporting of case decisions. 47 Much as
it had in England, the law had become less dependent upon natural or divine
law and more a law of artificial reason.48 It also became more the function of
a professional, well-trained legal profession with an interest in increasing the
power of the court system. 49 Once the states had adopted50 the parts of

42. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 377
(1833) (quoted in Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 903–04 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as
moot on other grounds en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000)).
43. DAVID A. LOCKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 170 (1938).
44. William D. Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent, and Originalism, 19 VT. L.
REV. 5, 6 (1994).
45. JACOB ERNEST COOKE, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 29 (1982).
46. Bader, supra note 44, at 11 (quoting WILLIAM KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES
KENT LL.D. 18 (1898)).
47. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 89 (3d ed. 2005).
48. Compare Mark L. Jones, Fundamental Dimensions of Law and Legal Education: An
Historical Framework—A History of U.S. Legal Education Phase I: From the Founding of the
Republic Until the 1860s, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1041, 1099–1102 (2006) (recounting at length
the circumstances of Lord Coke‘s explanation of artificial reason in the law) and Bernadette Meyler,
Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 585 (2006) (discussing Coke‘s
description of artificial reason) with Carl F. Stychin, The Commentaries of Chancellor James Kent
and the Development of an American Common Law, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 440, 451–52 (1993)
(discussing Chancellor Kent‘s similar view of American law as founded upon such ―cultivated and
artificial reason[ing]‖).
49. Bader, supra note 44, at 6–7; Stychin, supra note 48, at 451–52.
50. The technical term is ―received.‖
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English common law they felt were applicable and developed their own
common law precedents, precedent took—and has maintained—a prominent
position in American jurisprudence. 51
Throughout the nineteenth century, stare decisis strengthened in the
United States.52 Chief Justice John Marshall‘s opinion in the landmark
Marbury v. Madison emphasizes the importance of each judicial decision as
an element of the developing case law. 53 Justice Story‘s well-known
comment about the centrality of adherence to precedent in American law
shows a similar reverence for all cases being of precedential value: ―A more
alarming doctrine could not be promulgated by any American court, than that
it was at liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions, and to decide for
itself, without reference to the settled course of antecedent principles.‖ 54
From Justice Story‘s time to today, adherence to precedent and the application
of stare decisis have been the most prominent features of the American legal
system. 55 Indeed, ―[o]ld common-law attitudes toward precedent are so
deeply ingrained in the behavior of American lawyers and judges that they
hardly rise to the conscious level,‖ 56 and ―American attitudes toward
precedent are the attitudes of Coke, Blackstone, Marshall, and Kent, although
courts no longer feel the need to cite to these authors, or the decisions on
which they relied.‖57 That the concepts of precedent and stare decisis are
inherent in our legal system is easy to see, but they have been sidestepped,
without real consideration, by the unpublication system.
C. Universal Publication in the Twentieth Century
While neither precedent nor case publication is a precondition for the
other,58 reliable case reports do strengthen the use of precedent. 59 The desire
for an American common law noted above led to states designating ―official‖

51. Mortimer N.S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of America, 54 AM.
J. COMP. L. SUPP. 67, 67 (2006).
52. Healy, supra note 31, at 87.
53. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (―It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.‖). Judge Arnold‘s phrasing of this principle
in Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), seems apt: ―Inherent in every
judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a general principle or rule of law.‖
54. STORY, supra note 42, § 377.
55. Sellers, supra note 51, at 67.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 73.
58. BAKER, supra note 19, at 204 (explaining that even when the only record of decision was
the courts‘ rolls, lawyers and judges would rely upon their own memories and understanding of the
cases‘ decisions ―vouch[ing] [for] the record‖ as needed).
59. CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 297 (7th ed. 1964).
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state reporters to increase the reliability of reports and create more systematic
coverage in the early nineteenth century. 60 What had once been the bailiwick
of motivated jurists and practitioners became a government function, and
while this provided an official common reference, it was often slow and not as
useful as the former reporters.61 By the end of that century, John B. West and
the West Publishing Co. changed the face of legal publishing by producing
more efficient, complete, and systematic reports.62 West‘s goal was
interesting in two respects. First, he sought ―to collect, arrange in an orderly
manner and put into convenient and inexpensive form in the shortest possible
time, the material which every judge and lawyer must use.‖ 63 This statement
reveals the importance, visible even to a non-lawyer, that the legal system
placed on its decisions. Second, West chose to publish all judicial decisions,
rather than choosing to publish only a selected subset of them. 64 This move
was a departure from past practice and had its critics, but West‘s perception of
the market was right—―[l]awyers chose the comprehensive [system] . . .
preferring that all precedent be available.‖ 65
In the early twentieth century, lawyers‘ desire for comprehensive
reporting of actual case decisions was poignantly shown by the rejection of
the American Law Institute‘s attempt to replace case law with a Restatement
that extracted the ―best‖ principles of law. 66 Unwilling to accept that only
certain core-principle cases mattered, lawyers continued to cite cases and
relied upon the Restatement as a useful, but secondary, source. 67 Attempting
to again direct lawyers only to certain allegedly more important cases by
declaring certain cases unworthy at the time of publication has been similarly
ineffective. The legal market has demanded publication and now citation of
these decisions, and has used unpublished decisions throughout the life of the
unpublication system.

60. Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75
CAL. L. REV. 15, 19 (1987).
61. Id. at 20.
62. Id. at 21.
63. John B. West, A Symposium of Law Publishers, 23 AM. L. REV. 396, 406 (1889), quoted in
Thomas A. Woxland, Forever Associated With the Practice of Law: The Early Years of the West
Publishing Company, 5 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 115, 118–19 (1985).
64. Berring, supra note 60, at 21.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 23.
67. Id.
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D. Limited Publication and Justification
Complaints about the growing body of case law are certainly not new. 68
However, the modern unpublication system was set in motion in 1964 when
the Federal Judicial Conference recommended that the United States Courts of
Appeals consider reporting only those decisions that would be of ―general
precedential value‖ in order to deal with ―the ever increasing practical
difficulty and economic cost of establishing and maintaining . . . law library
facilities.‖69 Little action was taken on this suggestion until the 1973 Federal
Judicial Center‘s Advisory Council on Appellate Justice issued a report,
Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions, recommending limited
publication and citation that included a draft plan for circuit courts to adopt. 70
In that report, nonpublication and noncitation seemed to go hand-in-hand
because permitting citation would create a market for these decisions. 71 The
federal circuit courts began to adopt rules limiting publication and citation,
mostly according to the draft plan. 72 By 1974, each circuit, which had
previously published all opinions,73 had submitted plans to the Judicial
Conference for how it would limit publication and citation. 74
However, neither the 1964 Conference nor the 1973 Committee openly
denied precedential status to these new unpublished opinions.75 Publication
plans limited publication to those cases of greatest, broadest precedential
value but did not inherently diminish the precedential value of other cases. 76
In fact, the Advisory Council expressly considered a provision assigning

68. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167,
1168–69 & n.17 (1978) (noting a prominent federal judge‘s complaints about volume voiced in
1915).
69. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 CONFERENCE REPORTS], cited in
Reynolds & Richman, supra note 68, at 1169 n.17; Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A
Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 219 n.1 (1999).
70. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 1, at 4.
71. Id. at 6.
72. See id. app. I at 22–23; see also Norman R. Williams, The Failings of Originalism: The
Federal Courts and the Power of Precedent, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 761, 770 n.29, 772 (2004).
73. David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1133, 1142 (2002); see also Reynolds & Richman, supra note 68, at 1171.
74. Berring, supra note 60, at 15–20 (noting West Publishing Co.‘s policy of publishing all
case opinions rather than some subset of them in a movement toward complete publication); Jon A.
Strongman, Comment, Unpublished Opinions, Precedent, and the Fifth Amendment: Why Denying
Unpublished Opinions Precedential Value is Unconstitutional, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 195, 197 (2001)
(noting that the 1970s proved a breaking point for the practice of uniform publication of federal
circuit opinions).
75. Williams, supra note 72, at 770–71.
76. 1964 CONFERENCE REPORTS, supra note 69, at 11.
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unpublished opinions no precedential value, but it purposely avoided making
such a suggestion. 77 Instead, it attempted to take a position that ―deal[t] with
use rather than philosophic effect‖;78 that is, it recommended merely denying
publication and citation of the unpublished opinions and said nothing about
their actual precedential value. 79 Though the circuit courts initially took a
similar approach by adopting publication plans that did not mandate a lesser
or different precedential status for unpublished decisions,80 within a few
years, most federal court rules made these unpublished cases
nonprecedential.81
Such a progression, from nonpublished to noncitable to nonprecedential,
seems logical and in its own way almost necessary. 82 Limited publication is
not a new idea; it dates back to the earliest reporters, which were selective in
what they published. 83 But declaring decisions to be uncitable and, moreover,
not precedent was contrary to jurisprudential theory underlying the common
law paradigm. 84 This removal of decisions from the body of common law

77. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 1, at 20.
78. Id. at 20–21. Justice Alito described this same structural shift somewhat more charitably:
[I]t struck me that the judges of the early 1970s, mostly World War II veterans,
had responded to the tremendous increase in the appellate caseload with the
same uncomplaining, can-do attitude that their generation had displayed as
young men. They quickly identified a number of techniques that permitted the
courts of appeals to keep up with their cases without seeming to make
fundamental alterations in their mode of operation.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, How Did We Get Here? Where Are We Going?, Keynote Address at
Washington and Lee University School of Law, Law Review Symposium: Have We Ceased to Be a
Common Law Country? A Conversation on Unpublished, Depublished, Withdrawn and Per Curiam
Opinions SSA-01710 (Mar. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Alito Symposium Address] (transcript available at
http://www.law.com/pdf/dc/alito_unpublished.pdf).
79. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 1, at 20.
80. Williams, supra note 72, at 771.
81. Id. at 772.
82. ―Unpublished‖ cases that remained citable and precedential would be sought out despite
their formal publication status, but creating a rule that a decision is both noncitable and
nonprecedential effectively removes that decision from the body of common law. Only by restricting
opinions on all three grounds (publication, citation, and precedent) could one hope to make some
opinions truly ―disposable.‖ This, of course, was unsuccessful because practitioners placed value on
these opinions despite their diminished status. See generally, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, The Practice of
Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive
Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399 (2002) (examining the recent surveys of federal judges and
lawyers); Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and
Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940 (1989)
(examining a survey of how government litigants use unpublished opinions).
83. Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions: A
Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 121 (1994).
84. Id. at 128–45.

2009]

ENDING THE UNPUBLICATION SYSTEM

699

was a fundamental shift in the common law system. 85 Even in the early days
of Yearbooks or the unsettled post-Revolution days of early American courts,
no matter how scarce the record, cases could always be cited to the court as
evidence of its past rulings. In the unpublication system of the mid-1970s,
however, federal courts were unwilling to be bound by what they had done in
a similar case in the past; in fact, they were unwilling to even be told about
it.86 Not because they had decided it inapplicable, but because another panel
of the court had decided ex ante, at the time of the decision, that it would not
aid future decision-makers.87 Neither the 1973 Committee‘s report nor its
recommendation reveal that any consideration was given to whether the
federal circuits had the power to remove some cases from the body of
precedent, whether such a move would be constitutional, or whether
jurisprudentially this was a good idea. What we now know is that the market
for these decisions never abated (and they are now published thanks to
improved technology) and that both judges and lawyers continue to believe
they ought to be citable (as evidenced by the new FRAP 32.1).
E. Unraveling of the Unpublication System
The unpublication system is at its base a simple idea. One way to reduce
―the ever increasing practical difficulty and economic cost of establishing and
maintaining private and public law library facilities‖ 88 is to publish fewer
85. English and early American practice uniformly allowed citation to and reliance upon prior
decisions regardless of their publication status. Modern English practice is similar to its historical
practice: unreported cases are unlikely to be cited but may be cited, if appropriate. See ROBERT J.
MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 104 (1990). But see F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords: How Automation
Has Transformed the Law, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 563, 565–66 (2002) (quoting Roderick Munday, The
Limits of Citation Determined, 80 LAW SOC‘Y GAZETTE 1337, 1337 (1983) (claiming the British
courts are ―restricting the use of unreported materials which the computer revolution has suddenly
made available to the profession. In particular, the House of Lords . . . has effectively outlawed the
citation of unreported cases in argument before it‖)).
86. Arnold, supra note 69, at 221 (―The bar is gagged. We are perfectly free to depart from
past opinions if they are unpublished, and whether to publish them is entirely our own choice.‖).
87. This shift was borne not out of a philosophical or jurisprudential need to prune the law;
rather, it was created because of a need to reduce the expense of publishing, collecting, and
maintaining law libraries as well as reducing the workload of the federal judiciary and lawyers. See
STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 1, at 6–8. Aside from a general comment that
―[u]nlimited proliferation of published opinions constitutes a burden and a threat to a cohesive body
of law,‖ the balance of the Committee‘s seven factors are made up of pragmatic concerns about
workload and logistics—many of which are wholly inapplicable in today‘s legal information setting.
Id. at 6. Without diminishing the true economic and pragmatic need to deal with the problem of
volume, which is a real one, it is troubling that the jurisprudential problems were not explicitly raised
and weighed in to the proposed solution.
88. 1964 CONFERENCE REPORTS, supra note 69, at 11 (cited in Arnold, supra note 69, at 219
n.1; Reynolds & Richman, supra note 68, at 1169 n.17). A 1990 Federal Courts Study Committee,
created by Congress in 1988, recognized that the decision to limit publication and citation was
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cases. However, to achieve this, the cases must be declared uncitable, or
publishers will continue to publish them. 89 Finally, if the case decisions were
unpublished and uncitable, perhaps they are not precedent. This last piece,
the least justified and most important piece, is the only one of the three that
remains.
This tripartite scheme has unraveled under the natural pressure of the
American legal system. Publication of these decisions has returned to near
universality. 90 Citation of these decisions has been returned by federal
procedural rule. 91 What remains is the question of the precedential value of
these decisions—the very ―morass of jurisprudence‖ the 1973 Committee was
unwilling to wade into.
Comprehensive publication of these opinions is now a foregone
conclusion. Technological advances have drastically altered the landscape of
legal publishing and legal research over the last thirty to forty years. 92
Unpublished decisions, despite their moniker, are typically included in the
commercial databases right alongside published decisions, such that a search
for a given term in the Sixth Circuit, for example, retrieves both published and
unpublished cases containing that term. Similarly, a search using West‘s
Keynotes or Lexis‘s similar system retrieves both published and unpublished
cases. Citation is now also a settled issue. 93 Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 permits citation of all decisions issued after January 1, 2007.94
The federal rulemaking process that led to this final rule is a long one, welldetailed elsewhere. 95 It is worth noting, however, that the Advisory
Committee, which studied the issue and drafted the rule, was firm in its
support of the new rule.96 Most importantly, at least for the purposes of this
always one of pragmatism and never one of principle, explaining, ―[t]he policy in courts of appeals
of not publishing certain opinions, and concomitantly restricting their citation, has always been a
concession to perceived necessity.‖ FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE 130 (1990).
89. This happened anyway, regardless of the citation rules, which demonstrates the legal
community‘s understanding of the value of these cases. See Gant, supra note 4, at 709–10;
Shuldberg, supra note 4, at 551. See generally E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347,
§ 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006)); WEST‘S FEDERAL
APPENDIX.
90. Gant, supra note 4, at 709–10; Shuldberg, supra note 4, at 551. See generally EGovernment Act of 2002, § 205(a)(5); WEST‘S FEDERAL APPENDIX.
91. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
92. Shuldberg, supra note 4, at 551 (―These historic rationales for the limited publication/nocitation plans warrant re-examination in light of current technology.‖).
93. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
94. Id.
95. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 94–106; Schiltz, supra note 18, at 1434–58.
96. At its April 2004 meeting, every member, save one, spoke in favor of the rule, and most did
so in very serious terms, arguing that ―an Article III court should not be able to forbid parties from
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Article, is that Committee members, including Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.
(now Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court) and Judge Samuel A.
Alito (now Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court), noted that
in their circuits, which already liberalized citation to allow unpublished
opinions, no delay, backlogs, increased workload, or other problems were
occurring, and both favored the rule. 97 Approval of this rule was also
widespread among jurists and lawyers practicing in the federal system. 98
What needs to be done ―is to wade into the ‗morass of jurisprudence‘ and
confront the issue of precedential status. It is an issue of both principle and
pragmatism, of what we must do and what we ought to do.‖ 99 To continue to
allow the tail of practicality to wag the jurisprudential dog is to perpetuate a
jurisprudence of doubt. Denying the precedential value of these decisions,
now widely published and freely citable, is fraught with constitutional
infirmities and practical problems.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR RETURNING TO PRECEDENT
There are numerous arguments for acknowledging the precedential status
of all opinions.100 First, the premises on which the unpublication system was
built were faulty in the mid-1970s, and the ground has only shifted even
further out from underneath them since then. Second, the practice of declaring
some opinions not precedent at the time of decision is unconstitutional
because it is outside of the judicial power granted by the Constitution and
because it violates equal protection and due process. 101 Finally, both legal and
lay audiences continue to believe in the power of precedent. 102 The
citing back to it the public actions that the court itself has taken‖ and
[i]t is antithetical to American values and to the common law system for a court
to forbid a party or an attorney from calling the court‘s attention to its own prior
decisions, from arguing to the court that its prior decisions were or were not
correct, and from arguing that the court should or should not act consistently
with those prior decisions in the present case.
Minutes of the Spring 2004 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 7–8 (Apr. 13–
14, 2004) [hereinafter Advisory Committee], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
app0404.pdf. Other members called no-citation rules ―extreme‖ and ―ludicrous,‖ and one memberjudge noted that limited citation rules made federal circuit judges ―the only government officials who
can shield themselves from being confronted with their past actions.‖ Id. at 8.
97. Id. at 7–8; see also Cleveland, supra note 12, at 102.
98. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 102–03; Schiltz, supra note 18, at 1453–57; Minutes of the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 11 (June 17–18, 2004), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/june2004.pdf.
99. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 106.
100. Id. at 106–73.
101. Id. at 147–61.
102. Id. at 162–73.

702

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:685

expectation that the way a court decided a case yesterday is predictive of how
it will (and ought to) rule tomorrow is well-ingrained in our legal system. 103
This powerful concept of how precedent underlies our legal system has
sustained demand of unpublished opinions throughout the thirty-five-year
unpublication system‘s operation, and it has led to the return of citation of
these decisions.104 Among this panoply of arguments arrayed against the
unpublication system, the constitutional arguments are ripe for Supreme Court
review. While the others provide background for any argument to the Court,
it is the core constitutional claims that are most likely to gain certiorari.
Potential constitutional challenges could be brought on any of three bases:
1) judicial power under Article III meant the power to decide cases according
to precedent; 2) nonprecedential opinions allow for unequal treatment of
similarly situated parties in a way that violates the Equal Protection Clause;
and 3) the removal of the ability to rely on all prior cases as precedent, a wellestablished feature of the common law, violates the Due Process Clause.
The fundamental constitutional infirmity with the process of denying the
precedential status of unpublished cases is that Article III of the United States
Constitution does not give federal courts the authority to decide which of their
cases are precedential and which are good only for a single time and place.
The crux of this argument is that all cases decided by the federal courts are
precedent. The foremost proponent of this view, in both time and importance,
has been Judge Richard Arnold.105 Some proposed such a view of precedent
prior to Judge Arnold‘s writings,106 and many picked up the banner after
Judge Arnold‘s provocative decision in Anastasoff v. United States.107 In
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d
1054 (8th Cir. 2000); Arnold, supra note 69, at 221.
106. See, e.g., In re Rules of U.S. Ct. of App. for 10th Cir., Adopted Nov. 18, 1986, 955 F.2d
36, 37 (1992) (Halloway, Barrett & Baldock, JJ., dissenting) (―Each ruling, published or
unpublished, involves the facts of a particular case and the application of law—to the case.
Therefore all rulings of this court are precedents, like it or not, and we cannot consign any of them to
oblivion by merely banning their citation.‖); Bader, supra note 44, at 9–11; Henry Paul Monaghan,
Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 754–55 (1988).
107. Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West’s Federal Appendix: The Ground
Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 1–2 (2002); Richard B. Cappalli, The
Common Law’s Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755, 759 (2003);
Charles R. Eloshway, Say It Ain’t So: Non-Precedential Opinions Exceed the Limits of Article III
Powers, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 632, 632–33 (2002); Kenneth Anthony Laretto, Precedent, Judicial
Power, and the Constitutionality of “No-Citation” Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 1037, 1037–38 (2002); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law:
What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 73 (2001);
Penelope Pether, Take a Letter, Your Honor: Outing the Judicial Epistemology of Hart v. Massanari,
62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1553, 1557 (2005); Johanna S. Schiavoni, Who’s Afraid of Precedent?:
The Debate Over the Precedential Value of Unpublished Opinions, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1864
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Anastasoff, Judge Arnold authored an Eighth Circuit panel decision ruling that
denying decisions precedential status exceeded the court‘s ―judicial power‖
granted by Article III. 108 This decision was later vacated when the United
States changed its policy and made the case itself moot. 109 However, this
reading of Article III still has considerable merit. 110 Article III, Section 1,
Clause 1 of the United States Constitution states: ―The judicial power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.‖ 111 The
term ―judicial power‖ is not any further defined, but Judge Arnold sets forth a
persuasive argument that the Framers understood a grant of limited power and
that power does not extend to rendering nonprecedential opinions. 112 As a
first principle, Anastasoff finds that every judicial decision is a declaration of
law, which must be applied in subsequent similar cases.113 The Framers were
influenced by the writings of Coke, Hale, and Blackstone, which describe a
common law system in which ―the judge‘s duty to follow precedent derives
from the nature of the judicial power itself.‖114 Such authors viewed each
decision of the court as adding to the body of law, ―the law in that case, being
solemnly declared and determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps
indifferent, is now become a permanent rule.‖ 115 The Framers‘ writings
reveal a similar understanding of the centrality of precedent to the judicial
power of the early American courts. For example, James Madison understood
(2002); Steve Sheppard, The Unpublished Opinion: How Richard Arnold’s Anastasoff Opinion is
Saving America’s Courts from Themselves, 2002 ARK. L. NOTES 85, 86 (2002); Michael B.W.
Sinclair, Anastasoff Versus Hart: The Constitutionality and Wisdom of Denying Precedential
Authority to Circuit Court Decisions, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 695, 695, 699 (2003); Strongman, supra
note 74, at 204; Jennifer Adams, Comment, Law Today; Gone Tomorrow, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 659,
661 (2001); William J. Miller, Note, Chipping Away at the Dam: Anastasoff v. United States and the
Future of Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals and Beyond, 50 DRAKE L.
REV. 181, 183 (2001); Sheree L.K. Nitta, Note, The Price of Precedent: Anastasoff v. United States,
23 U. HAW. L. REV. 795, 796 (2001); Lance A. Wade, Note, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The
Procedural Due Process Argument Against Rules Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Judicial
Decisions, 42 B.C. L. REV. 695, 731–32 (2001).
108. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900, vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
109. Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d, 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000).
110. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 130–45.
111. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
112. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900.
113. Id. at 899–900 (―Inherent in every judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a
general principle or rule of law. This declaration of law is authoritative to the extent necessary for
the decision, and must be applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties. These principles,
which form the doctrine of precedent, were well established and well regarded at the time this nation
was founded. The Framers of the Constitution considered these principles to derive from the nature
of judicial power, and intended that they would limit the judicial power delegated to the courts by
Article III of the Constitution.‖ (citations omitted)).
114. Id. at 901.
115. Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69).
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the courts as being bounded by the ―authoritative force‖ of ―judicial
precedents‖ and observing the ―‗obligation arising from judicial expositions
of the law on succeeding judges.‘‖116 Similarly, Alexander Hamilton
emphatically stated that ―[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents,
which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that
comes before them.‖117
However, ―the Anti-Federalists also assumed that federal judicial
decisions would become authorities in subsequent cases.‖118 For example, the
Essays of Brutus Number XV reveals concern that ―one adjudication will form
a precedent to the next, and this to a following one. These cases will
immediately affect individuals only; so that a series of determinations will
probably take place before even the people will be informed of them,‖ 119
while the Federal Farmer expressed the concern that the federal courts to be
established had ―no precedents in this country, as yet, to regulate the divisions
in equity as in Great Britain; equity, therefore, in the supreme court for many
years will be mere discretion.‖120 The contemporary writings reveal a broad
and deep-seated understanding that the courts under the new United States
Constitution would be of binding authority. 121 For the Framers, the concept of
precedent was part and parcel of their understanding of judicial power, a
power that was bounded by an obligation to find the law rather than make
it.122 It seems contrary to every notion of judicial power at the time of the
founding that the Framers would have intended a system (or understood one)
that would allow federal courts to make a decision good in only a single time
and place and having no bearing on later decisions, or that courts could
without reason or explanation depart from past decisions. In addition, the
Framers did not possess the same ―correspondence‖ between publication and
116. Id. at 902 n.10 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25,
1831), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE P OLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES
MADISON 390, 391 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981)).
117. Id. at 902 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (ALEXANDER HAMILTON)).
118. Id. at 902–03 (citing ESSAYS OF BRUTUS NO. XV (Mar. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 437, 441 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL
FARMER NO. 3 (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI -FEDERALIST, supra, at 234, 244.
119. ESSAYS OF BRUTUS NO. XV, supra note 118, at 441.
120. LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER NO. 3, supra note 118, at 224.
121. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903; see also Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the
Horizontal Force of Precedent, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075, 1101 (2003) (―[R]emarks on the
subject of precedent of these most prominent Federalists and Anti-Federalists show that they adhered
to a theory of precedent basically consistent with the major common-law treatises of the day, and that
they believed that the accumulating force of precedents would, over time, tend to authoritatively ‗fix‘
the meaning of the Constitution. One theme to be found in their remarks is that adherence to
precedent forestalls the accumulation of arbitrary power in the courts . . . .‖).
122. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 901–02.
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precedent that underlies the 1973 Committee‘s work. ―Unpublished‖ did not
historically mean ―unprecedential,‖ and to equate the two flies in the face of
the expectations and experiences of English common law and the founding
generation of this country.123 Judge Arnold summarized his case for the
Framers‘ understanding of precedent as an inherent aspect of judicial power:
To summarize, in the late eighteenth century, the doctrine of
precedent was well-established in legal practice (despite the
absence of a reporting system), regarded as an immemorial
custom, and valued for its role in past struggles for liberty.
The duty of courts to follow their prior decisions was
understood to derive from the nature of the judicial power
itself and to separate it from a dangerous union with the
legislative power. The statements of the Framers indicate an
understanding and acceptance of these principles. We
conclude therefore that, as the Framers intended, the doctrine
of precedent limits the ―judicial power‖ delegated to the
courts in Article III.124
A second constitutional infirmity in the denial of precedent to unpublished
cases is that it violates the Equal Protection Clause. 125 The practice of
designating some opinions as nonprecedential violates equal protection
because it treats similarly situated litigants in a disparate manner. 126 This
unequal treatment inhibits a fundamental right, and the government‘s
pragmatic justification is insufficient to meet the strict scrutiny standard. 127
123. Id. at 903 (―[T]he Framers did not regard this absence of a reporting system as an
impediment to the precedential authority of a judicial decision. . . . [J]udges and lawyers of the day
recognized the authority of unpublished decisions even when they were established only by memory
or by a lawyer‘s unpublished memorandum.‖); see also BAKER, supra note 19, at 204 (noting that
even the earliest common law courts allowed counsel to vouch for the record of prior cases when
urging the court to decide similarly).
124. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903; see also STORY, supra note 42, §§ 377–78 (―The case is not
alone considered as decided and settled; but the principles of the decision are held, as precedents and
authority, to bind future cases of the same nature. This is the constant practice under our whole
system of jurisprudence. Our ancestors brought it with them, when they first emigrated to this
country; and it is, and always has been considered, as the great security of our rights, our liberties,
and our property. It is on this account, that our law is justly deemed certain, and founded in
permanent principles, and not dependent upon the caprice or will of particular judges. A more
alarming doctrine could not be promulgated by any American court, than that it was at liberty to
disregard all former rules and decisions, and to decide for itself, without reference to the settled
course of antecedent principles.‖).
125. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 107, at 204; Strongman, supra note 74, at 215–17; Wade,
supra note 107, at 714.
126. Strongman, supra note 74, at 220.
127. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 147–55; see, e.g., 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 1116–
1120 (2007) (setting forth the standards for scrutiny).
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The unpublication system‘s unequal treatment of similarly situated parties—
actually the exact same party—is apparent in a pair of cases in which the
Dallas Area Rapid Transit authority (DART) received diametrically opposed
decisions from the Fifth Circuit without explanation in a span of just three
years. In 1998 in Anderson v. DART, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas held that ―DART is a political subdivision of the
state of Texas, and is therefore immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment,‖128 and the Fifth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion. 129
When the Supreme Court denied certiorari, DART must have felt about as
secure as possible that the rule establishing its immunity was settled in the
Fifth Circuit. Yet while the federal district court applied this rule again in
2000 in Williams v. DART,130 this time the Fifth Circuit held that DART was
not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity based on Fifth Circuit case law
dating back to 1986.131 The Fifth Circuit in Williams is wholly dismissive of
the prior result in Anderson (and two similar cases).132 So, because the prior
case holding DART immune was unpublished, it was not accorded
precedential weight under the Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5.4,133 and the court felt
free to depart from it without distinguishing it in some fashion (which it could
not do because the legally relevant facts were identical) or overruling the law
on which the case was based.134 Two identical cases decided within two years
were decided differently based not on factually distinguishable factors or a
change in the governing law, but merely the whim of one panel choosing not

128. Anderson v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, No. CA3:97-CV-1834-BC, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15493, at *24 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 1998), aff’d per curiam, Anderson v. DART, 180 F.3d
265 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1062 (1999).
129. Anderson, 180 F.3d 265, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1062 (1999).
130. The district court stated that ―‗[i]t is firmly established that DART is a governmental unit
or instrumentality of the State of Texas‘‖ and therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Williams v. DART, 256 F.3d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) (Smith, Jones & DeMoss, JJ., dissenting)
(quoting from district court opinion) (dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
131. Williams v. DART, 242 F.3d 315, 318–19 (5th Cir. 2001).
132. Id. at 319 (―Although all three cases upheld DART‘s immunity from suit, they are neither
binding nor persuasive in this context.‖).
133. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4 (―Unpublished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996, are not
precedent, except under the doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case . . . .‖).
134. Williams, 242 F.3d at 322 (holding that ―[t]he district court therefore erred in finding
DART immune from suit‖). This decision was not without a strong dissent. Williams, 256 F.3d at
260 (Smith, Jones & DeMoss, JJ., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en
banc) (―The refusal of the en banc court to rehear this case en banc is unfortunate, for this is an
opportunity to revisit the questionable practice of denying precedential status to unpublished
opinions. . . . I respectfully dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc, which would have given
this court an opportunity to examine the question of unpublished opinions generally, an issue that is
important to the fair administration of justice in this circuit.‖).
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to publish. Not only was the defendant DART similarly situated in each case,
but also as far as legally relevant facts go, it was identically situated.135
Another case that demonstrates the unequal treatment wrought by the
unpublication system can be found in the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in United
States v. Rivera-Sanchez.136 In that case, the Ninth Circuit was forced to
admit that no less than twenty prior panels had issued unpublished decisions
on a certain issue, and those decisions split three different ways on the
answer.137 For three years, these Ninth Circuit cases escaped review and
provided different answers to the same legal question. If not for the RiveraSanchez court‘s request during oral argument that counsel prepare and provide
a list of unpublished cases, this unequal disposition of cases would have
continued.138 The confusion within the circuit was resolved only because the
Ninth Circuit itself ignored its own noncitation rule. 139
These are not isolated examples. In fact, such situations may be common.
―Empirical evidence suggests that cases such as Christie and Anderson are
more common than one might think.‖ 140 Unpublished cases contain ―a
noticeable number of reversals, dissents, or concurrences,‖ and ―significant
associations between case outcome and judicial characteristics.‖ 141 This
treatment of litigants violates equal protection. That is, ―failing to give
unpublished opinions precedential effect raises the very specter described by
the Eighth Circuit [in Anastasoff]: that like cases will be decided in unlike
ways‖142
The Supreme Court has made clear that ―[f]ew, if any, interests under the
Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by ‗impartial‘
jurors,‖143 and it has repeatedly held other concerns, such as the right to
135. See Williams, 256 F.3d at 260–61 (―If the Anderson panel had published its opinion, it
would have been binding on the panel in the instant case—Williams—and the result here would have
been different. Based, however, on the mere fortuity that the Anderson panel decided not to publish,
our panel in Williams was free to disagree with Anderson and to deny to DART the same immunity
that Anderson had conferred on it less than two years earlier. What is the hapless litigant or attorney,
or for that matter a federal district judge or magistrate judge, to do?‖).
136. 222 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000).
137. Id. at 1063.
138. Id.
139. See 9TH CIR. R. 36-3 (barring citation of unpublished opinions except for extremely
limited purposes).
140. Williams, 256 F.3d at 262 (Smith, Jones & DeMoss, JJ., dissenting) (dissenting from
denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (referring to Anderson v. DART, 180 F.3d 265 (5th Cir.
1999) (per curiam) (unpublished), and Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375MN, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 38446 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per curiam) (unpublished)).
141. Merritt & Brudney, supra note 107, at 120.
142. Id. at 119 (referring to, in part, Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 901, 905 (8th
Cir. 2000)).
143. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991).
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counsel, to be important in protecting the ―fundamental right to a fair trial.‖ 144
As such, strict scrutiny must be applied to the government‘s discrimination.
The government cannot meet the standard of demonstrating that this
discrimination inhibiting a fundamental right is necessary to achieve a
compelling government interest. The Court has rejected claims that
administrative efficiency was a compelling government interest sufficient to
justify discrimination based on gender. 145 Likewise, the Court has struck
down a statutory provision that inhibited a fundamental right by applying
strict scrutiny, stating, ―[s]ince the classification here touches on the
fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged
by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest.‖ 146
The Court has rejected arguments that administrative needs or budgetary
benefits of the program were compelling state interests in the face of such a
fundamental right.147 This denial of precedent is not sufficiently justified or
narrowly tailored.148
Finally, the practice of denial of precedent to some cases violates due
process. As with the equal protection claim, which has been raised by
commentators but not ruled on by the Court, it has been suggested that the
scheme of declaring some decisions nonprecedential violates due process
requirements. 149 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that: ―No person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .‖150 This clause has
been held to contain both substantive and procedural requirements. 151 The
substantive due process objection is similar to the equal protection objection
outlined above. 152 The right to a fair trial, as embodied in the requirement that
courts should be bound to rely upon prior decisions (or distinguish them or
144. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368 (1993) (right to counsel exists to protect the
fundamental right to a fair trial); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 137 n.8 (1994)
(peremptory challenges are a means to ensure the fundamental right to a fair trial); Chandler v.
Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 577 (1981) (Judicial control of media coverage of court proceedings are
constitutional when exercised to ―protect the fundamental right of the accused to a fair trial.‖).
145. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (―[O]ur prior decisions make clear that,
although efficacious administration of governmental programs is not without some importance, ‗the
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.‘‖) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 656 (1972)).
146. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
147. Id. at 636–38.
148. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 155.
149. Miller, supra note 107, at 204; Analisa Pratt, Comment, A Call for Uniformity in
Appellate Courts’ Rules Regarding Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
195, 214 (2005); Wade, supra note 107, at 722–31.
150. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
151. Pratt, supra note 149, at 214; Wade, supra note 107, at 717, 722–32.
152. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 156–61.
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change the law), is a ―fundamental right‖ and ―implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty‖ as set forth in the Constitution and intrinsic to our judicial
system. 153 The practice of issuing nonprecedential opinions infringes upon
that right154 and must, therefore, be subject to strict scrutiny and justified by
showing that the action is the least burdensome means of achieving a
compelling interest.155 As discussed above in the equal protection analysis,
the practice of declaring opinions in advance to hold no precedential weight is
not the least burdensome means of achieving any compelling state interest.156
The procedural due process requirement guarantees that people who are
deprived of life, liberty, or property ―are entitled to a reasonable level of
judicial or administrative process.‖157 This ―duty of government to follow a
fair process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person of his
possessions‖ serves ―not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual‖
but also ―[i]ts purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession
of property from arbitrary encroachment—to minimize substantively unfair or
mistaken deprivations of property.‖158 The Supreme Court has been skeptical
of the abrogation of a deeply rooted common law judicial procedure without
adequate replacement, often finding that such an abrogation violated litigants‘
procedural due process rights.159 A parallel case, Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,
demonstrates the due process violation present in denying a well-established
common law procedure. 160 In Honda, the Supreme Court invalidated, on due
process grounds, Oregon‘s departure from the well-established common law
procedure of judicial oversight of punitive damage awards.161 The Court ruled
that the practice of judicial oversight of punitive damage verdicts remained a

153. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
154. Cf. Loritz v. U.S. Ct. of App. for 9th Cir., 382 F.3d 990, 992 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding a
litigant whose case was disposed of by unpublished opinion lacked Article III standing b ecause he
was asserting due process rights of later litigants). But see id. at 993 (Beam, J., concurring) (stating
that the argument that prior unpublished case law, if it were precedential, would dictate a different
outcome creates the necessary standing).
155. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (stating that ―classifications affecting
fundamental rights are given the most exacting scrutiny‖ (citation omitted)); Harper v. Va. Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (―We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and
liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or
restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.‖).
156. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 155.
157. Pratt, supra note 149, at 214; Wade, supra note 107, at 717.
158. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972).
159. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994) (holding that ―Oregon has removed
that safeguard [which the common law provided] without providing any substitute procedure and
without any indication that the danger of arbitrary awards has in any way subsided over time‖); see
also Pratt, supra note 149, at 214; Wade, supra note 107, at 717.
160. See Honda Motor Co., 512 U.S. at 430.
161. Id. at 432.
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part of common law from 1763 England to present-day American courts.162
Based on this well-established protection in the common law, the Court held
Oregon‘s statute denying remittur violative of due process. 163 Honda
provides, by analogy, a simple but persuasive argument that the practice of
denying precedential status to unpublished decisions violates procedural due
process.164 The practice of referring to past cases as establishing the
governing law stretches back further and is of far more fundamental
importance than the judicial oversight of punitive damage awards. 165 Despite
the efficiency gains of the unpublication system, they must give way to due
process rights.166
These constitutional arguments seem both strong and, thus far,
unexamined.167 They should be examined. The Supreme Court‘s past
jurisprudence on the unpublication system reveals an uneasiness with the
practice.168 Likewise, several individual Justices have expressed concern that
unpublished opinions are a troubling practice or at odds with historical
notions of precedent. 169
IV. SUPREME COURT‘S PRIOR RULINGS AND PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI
DENIALS
The question of what the Supreme Court might do must begin by
examining what it has done in the past.170 The Court has granted certiorari on
only a single case squarely addressing the issue, and it decided that case on

162. Id. at 421–29.
163. Id. at 430.
164. Wade, supra note 107, at 722.
165. Id. at 723 (―The history of lawyers citing to all prior judicial decisions is much lengthier
than the comprehensive punitive damage review considered ‗deeply rooted‘ by the Honda Court.
Whereas the Honda Court traced the practice of punitive damage review to the mid-seventeenth
century, the ability to cite prior decisions dates back four hundred years further—to the middle of the
thirteenth century. The long history of this citation procedure is sufficient to indicate a deeply-rooted
common law practice in accord with Honda.‖).
166. Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (―[T]he Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and
the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a
vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize
praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.‖).
167. Nonconstitutional arguments based on the underlying mistaken premises and community
understanding of precedent also are unexamined. See Cleveland, supra note 12, at 106–30, 162–73.
168. See infra Part IV.
169. See infra Part V.
170. Though the Court is not bound by its past decisions in the purest precedential sense, stare
decisis is, of course, a powerful factor. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
854 (1992). This Article is confined to an examination of what the Court has done regarding the
specific issue of unpublished opinions.
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jurisdictional grounds and did not reach the unpublication issue. 171 The Court
has denied certiorari on numerous cases directly raising the issue,172 and on
several occasions it has expressed concern at the unpublication practice in the
context of other cases.173 Individual Justices, writing in dissents or separate
concurrences, have also expressed concern that unpublished cases were
evading review or being improperly used.174
A. Supreme Court’s Single Grant of Certiorari
The Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality or propriety
of the unpublication system directly. It did accept certiorari on the issue once,
shortly after the unpublication system‘s inception, but it chose not to address
the issue in its opinion. 175 In Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections
171. Browder v. Dir., Dep‘t of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 258 & n.1 (1978) (After granting
certiorari on the issue, the Court did not address it.).
172. Untracht v. Fikri, 128 S. Ct. 1666 (2008); Spiegel v. Volvo Cars N. Am., L.L.C., 128 S.
Ct. 911 (2008); Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 128 S. Ct. 669 (2007); Family Fare, Inc. v. NLRB, 127
S. Ct. 2991 (2007); Wheeler v. Mo. Dir. of Revenue, 549 U.S. 1266 (2007); Stilley v. Marschewski,
549 U.S. 1112 (2007); Shefchuk v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 549 U.S. 952 (2006); N. Pacifica L.L.C. v.
City of Pacifica, 546 U.S. 1138 (2006); Heavrin v. Schilling, 546 U.S. 1137 (2006); O.S.C. Co. v.
Zymblosky, 546 U.S. 936 (2005); Rana v. United States, 546 U.S. 877 (2005); Seils v. Rochester
City Sch. Dist., 544 U.S. 920 (2005); Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 543 U.S. 819 (2004); Schmier
v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 543 U.S. 818 (2004); Rodriguez v. HFP, Inc., 541 U.S. 903 (2004); Carey v.
Knox County, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004); Test v. Comm‘r, 538 U.S. 961 (2003); Martin v. KeyCorp, 538
U.S. 961 (2003); Berrafato v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 537 U.S. 1233 (2003);
S. Clay Prods., Inc. v. United Catalysts, Inc., 537 U.S. 1189 (2003); Lewin v. Cooke, 537 U.S. 881
(2002); Lemelson Med. v. Symbol Techs., 537 U.S. 825 (2002); Alcan Aluminum Corp. v.
Prudential Assurance Co., 536 U.S. 959 (2002); Wendt v. Mineta, 536 U.S. 941 (2002); Mims v.
United States, 534 U.S. 1132 (2002); Pappas v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 534 U.S. 1129 (2002); Segal v.
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 534 U.S. 1041 (2001); Bostron v. Massanari, 534 U.S. 896 (2001); Knight
v. Maleng, 534 U.S. 820 (2001); Smyly v. IBM, 528 U.S. 982 (1999); Schmier v. Jennings, 522 U.S.
1149 (1998); Culp v. Hood, 519 U.S. 1042 (1996); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Carroll, 516 U.S. 816 (1995);
Friedman v. Montgomery County, 489 U.S. 1079 (1989); Van Sant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 475 U.S.
1082 (1986), reh’g denied, 476 U.S. 1131 (1986); Do-Right Auto Sales v. U.S. Ct. of App. for 7th
Cir., 429 U.S. 917 (1976).
173. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 425 & n.3 (1993); Comm‘r v. McCoy,
484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 (1987).
174. See Langston v. United States, 506 U.S. 930, 930 (1992) (White & Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting); Costa v. United States, 506 U.S. 929, 929 (1992) (White & O‘Connor, JJ., dissenting);
Waller v. United States, 504 U.S. 962, 962–65 (1992) (White & O‘Connor, JJ., dissenting); Smith v.
United States, 502 U.S. 1017, 1019–20 & n.* (1991) (Blackmun, O‘Connor & Souter, JJ., dissenting)
(―The fact that the Court of Appeals‘ opinion is unpublished is irrelevant. Nonpublication must not
be a convenient means to prevent review. An unpublished opinion may have a lingering effect in the
Circuit and surely is as important to the parties concerned as is a published opinion.‖); Taylor v.
United States, 493 U.S. 906, 906–07 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring); St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Bhd.
of Ry., 484 U.S. 907, 907 (1987) (White & Brennan, JJ., dissenting); Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464
U.S. 965, 965–68 (1983) (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun., JJ., dissenting); Hyman v. Rickman, 446
U.S. 989, 990–91 (1980) (Blackmun, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
175. Browder, 434 U.S. at 258 n.1 (After granting certiorari on the issue, the Court did not
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of Illinois, the Supreme Court heard the case of petitioner Browder, who
alleged that his state court criminal conviction should be reversed because it
was based on a warrantless arrest, search, and seizure, and because of
irregularities in the federal courts‘ habeas review of his case. 176 The sixth and
final of Browder‘s questions presented to the Court was: ―Does a federal court
of appeals have the inherent power to withhold any of its opinions from
publication and to a priori deprive such opinions of precedential value?‖ 177
Browder argued in his brief that the federal circuit courts do not have the
power to deprive their decisions of precedential effect.178 Browder argued,
first, that unpublication of opinions creates the possibility that the decision of
the Seventh Circuit panel in his case was contrary to the law of the Seventh
Circuit.179 This possibility arises because of the possible existence of an
unpublished opinion (or opinions), which would be unavailable to him, and
because the unpublished nature of the disposition against him removed all
incentive for en banc review of his case. 180 Second, Browder argued that the
Supreme Court‘s refusal to promulgate a uniform rule and the circuit court‘s
wide variation on the precedential effect given to unpublished cases illustrated
the need for a Supreme Court ruling that all cases are precedential. 181 In
support of this assertion, Browder cited to Supreme Court cases emphasizing
the universality of precedent in all cases in the federal court. 182 For example,
in Hicks v. Miranda, the Court held that a decision on the merits, even one
contained only in a summary dismissal or affirmance, is precedential and
address it.).
176. Id.
177. Brief of Petitioner Ben Earl Browder at 7, Browder, 434 U.S. 257 (No. 76-5325), 1977
WL 204850 [hereinafter Browder Petition]. This question was presented in the petition for certiorari
as:
May a United States Court of Appeals reverse a decision of a district court in an
unpublished and non-citable opinion, when the case is not controlled by direct
precedent, involves a substantial question pertaining to the protections of the
Fourth Amendment, and where public notice of the decision might encourage
Illinois to follow the lead of the American Law Institute and other states in
enacting a statute to protect its citizenry from warrantless arrests for
investigation?
Brief for the Chicago Council of Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Browder, 434
U.S. 257 (No. 76-5325), 1977 WL 189280 [hereinafter Browder Brief Amicus Curiae].
178. Browder Petition, supra note 177, at 50 (―This is the first case to reach the Court where
the propriety of a circuit rule authorizing dispositions in unpublished orders which may not be cited
as precedent in subsequent cases is squarely at issue.‖).
179. Id. at 51.
180. Id. at 51–52.
181. Id. at 52–53.
182. Id. at 53 (citing Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S.
464 (1968)).
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binding on the lower courts.183 Third, Browder argued that freeing appellate
courts from the necessity of producing precedential decisions allows them ―‗to
avoid making a difficult or troublesome decision or to conceal divisive or
disturbing issues‘‖184—a prescient comment given the later remarks of federal
appellate Judges Arnold and Wald.185 Fourth, Browder noted that the chair of
the 1973 Committee upon which the unpublication system is based had, by
the time of the promulgation of the circuit rules, reconsidered his position and
stood against unpublication.186 Finally, Browder asserted that the act of
issuing nonprecedential opinions exceeded the circuit courts‘ rulemaking
authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (limiting the circuit courts‘ authority to
regulating practices of their own courts) and that the power to promulgate
rules with such a broad impact on all the federal courts and its litigants
properly belonged to the Supreme Court alone under 28 U.S.C. § 2072.187
In addition to Browder‘s arguments, the Chicago Council of Lawyers 188
filed an amicus curiae brief exclusively on the unpublication-nonprecedent
issue presented by the Seventh Circuit Rule 35, which permitted designation
of some decisions as unpublished. 189 The amicus brief addressed both
constitutional and nonconstitutional arguments against the unpublication
system. First, the amicus brief recited several nonconstitutional flaws in the
unpublication system that call out for Supreme Court action, including: 1) that
the system has an unequal impact on those who can search the courthouse
records versus those who have no access to unpublished opinions; 2) that the
authority of appellate courts to write single-use opinions reduces judicial rigor
183. Hicks, 422 U.S. at 343–45.
184. Browder Petition, supra note 177, at 54 (quoting NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers, 430 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1970)).
185. See Arnold, supra note 69, at 223; Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the
Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1995) (discussing her own
observations as a judge on the D.C. Circuit).
186. Browder Petition, supra note 177, at 55; see also PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE
ON APPEAL 31–43 (1976) (referring to the recommendations of the 1973 Committee, ―If a nonpublication policy is to be adopted, those guidelines seem sound. We do not, however, support such
a policy,‖ and regarding the issue of precedent specifically, ―trying to impose a non -precedent status
on decisions by declaring them non-citable is like attempting to throw away a boomerang. The
earlier decisions keep coming back because of lawyers‘ and judges‘ ingrained devotion to the force
of stare decisis‖).
187. Browder Petition, supra note 177, at 18–19, 56.
188. Browder Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 177, at 1–2 (―The Chicago Council of Lawyers
is an association of approximately 1,200 attorneys in Chicago. The Council‘s principal concern is
the improvement of the administration of justice, both in the federal and the state courts. . . . The
Council‘s interest in this case relates to petitioner‘s challenge to Circuit Rule 35 of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, entitled ‗Plan for Publication of Opinions of the Seventh
Circuit.‘ The Council is concerned that this Rule raises serious jurisprudential and constitutional
questions, as amicus discusses infra.‖).
189. Id.
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and jeopardizes the rightness of individual outcomes; 3) that rules that bar
litigants from relying on decisions do not also prohibit court use leading to
unequal use of unpublished decisions; 4) that guidelines for choosing which
cases to publish do not ensure the publication of all necessary cases; 5) that
unpublished cases unfairly limit litigants‘ ability to seek review; and 6) that
the system of selective publication creates an appearance of unfairness and
impropriety. 190 The amicus brief‘s constitutional argument relied primarily on
the First Amendment, citing the inherent public nature of the courts, a right to
know, the unpublication system‘s impermissible censorship of speech, and
unconstitutional vagueness. 191 The Chicago Lawyers‘ Council‘s Amicus
Brief expressed a grave concern about the practice of selective publication
and precedent.192 Yet the Respondent did not address the unpublication issue
in its statement of questions presented or argument.193
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not address the issue in its ruling in
Browder.194 Finding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the time
for appeal had expired before the motion was filed, the Court chose not to
address any of Browder‘s other claims. 195 Regarding the unpublished opinion
issue, the Court stated only, ―[f]inally, petitioner questioned the validity of the
Seventh Circuit‘s ‗unpublished opinion‘ rule. We leave these questions to
another day.‖196
B. Several Denials of Certiorari
Since Browder, the Court has never granted certiorari on a case directly
challenging the unpublished opinion practice. It has chosen not to hear cases
presenting the issue on several occasions. In at least thirty-six cases, the
constitutionality or propriety of the unpublication system (and its denial of
precedent) was directly challenged in the petition for certiorari.197 In seven
190. Id. at 4–6.
191. Id. at 45–55.
192. Id.
193. Brief of Respondent, Browder v. Dir., Dep‘t of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257 (1978) (No. 765325), 1977 WL 189277.
194. Browder, 434 U.S. at 258 n.1.
195. Id. at 258.
196. Id. at 258 & n.1.
197. Untracht Petition, supra note 14; Spiegel Petition, supra note 14; Canatella Petition, supra
note 14; Family Fare Petition, supra note 14; Wheeler Petition, supra note 14; Stilley Petition, supra
note 14; Shefchuk Petition, supra note 14; N. Pacifica Petition, supra note 14; Heavrin Petition,
supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition I, supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition II, supra note 14; Rana Petition,
supra note 14; Seils Petition, supra note 14; Zimmerman Petition, supra note 14; Schmier III
Petition, supra note 14; Rodriguez Petition, supra note 14; Carey Petition, supra note 14; Test Reply
Brief, supra note 14; Martin Petition, supra note 14; Berrafato Petition, supra note 14; S. Clay Prods.
Petition, supra note 14; Lewin Petition, supra note 14; Lemelson Med. Petition, supra note 14; Alcan
Aluminum Petition, supra note 14; Wendt Petition, supra note 14; Mims Petition, supra note 14;
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other petitions, the issue was discussed at some length in the petition without
being part of the question presented for certiorari.198
The first petition for certiorari directly challenging the use of unpublished
opinions was in Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.199 In Do-Right Auto Sales, the petitioner sought a writ of
mandamus, a rare and extraordinary remedy, overriding the circuit court‘s
striking of an unpublished opinion from the petitioner‘s brief.200 The Supreme
Court denied the petitioner‘s motion for leave to file a petition for writ of
mandamus without comment.201 After Do-Right Auto Sales, petitioners
continued to challenge the use of unpublished, allegedly nonprecedential,
opinions. During the period for which petitions are publicly available, 202
Pappas Petition, supra note 14; Segal Petition, supra note 14; Bostron Petition, supra note 14; Knight
Petition, supra note 14; Smyly Petition, supra note 14; Schmier II Petition, supra note 14; Culp
Petition, supra note 14; Litton Sys. Petition, supra note 14; Friedman Petition, supra note 14; Van
Sant Petition, supra note 14; Gant, supra note 4, at 717 n.53 (―‗Whether Seventh Circuit Rule 28,
which prohibits the publication of written ‗Orders‘ which set forth reasons for judgments, and further
prohibits a litigant from citing as precedent and relying upon such orders, denies due process of law
and violates First Amendment rights?‘‖ (quoting Motion for Leave to File Petition for Writs of
Mandamus and Prohibition at 2, Do-Right Auto Sales v. U.S. Ct. of App. for 7th Cir., 429 U.S. 917
(1976) (No. 85-1404))).
198. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16–17, Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 127 S. Ct. 2910 (2007) (No. 06-1175), 2007 WL 608452 (stating that the ―attempt to
sweep these four cases ‗under the rug‘ by issuing markedly similar unpublished decisions on a very
contentious issue of law represents a misuse of unpublished decisions‖); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 27–28, Cusano v. Klein, 549 U.S. 816 (2006) (No. 05-1492), 2006 WL 1440820
(expressing concern about the unpublished nature of decision below as contrary to established law);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, 7–8, 18 n.1, B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Rogers, 549 U.S. 824 (2006)
(No. 05-1624), 2006 WL 1706947 (disputing claim that an ―unpublished‖ decision below does not
cause conflict or justify certiorari); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21–23, Hatteberg v. Adair
Enters., 534 U.S. 890 (2001) (No. 01-102), 2001 WL 34116502 (pro se petition refers in passing to
Anastasoff and the unpublished opinion issue); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11–21, Youngblood
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 531 U.S. 1152 (2001) (No. 00-1105), 2001 WL 34117089 (arguing that
litigants have a right to know the reasons for a decision, though not necessarily claiming that there is
a right to publication or precedent); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15–21, Green v. City of Plano,
531 U.S. 1112 (2001) (No. 00-643), 2000 WL 34000170 (claiming departure from precedent via
unpublished opinion departs from accepted appellate methods without substantial analysis of the
legal standard at issue); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27–29, Bennett v. Law Firm of Jones,
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 519 U.S. 1108 (1997) (No. 96-678), 1996 WL 33439051 (arguing,
briefly, for precedential status for circuit opinions, but only to seek correction of the specific
unpublished case on appeal); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9–12, Stephenson v. Okla. Turnpike
Auth., 503 U.S. 971 (1992) (No. 91-1296), 1992 WL 12074502 (pro se petition containing a bare
allegation that the precedent-limiting rule of the Tenth Circuit exceeds its rulemaking authority
without explaining the basis for that claim or the relevance to the underlying case).
199. 429 U.S. 917 (1976) (denying a writ of mandamus filed following the Seventh Circuit‘s
striking of citation to an unpublished opinion from party‘s brief); see also Wade, supra note 107, at
713.
200. Do-Right Auto Sales, 429 U.S. 917; see also Wade, supra note 107, at 713.
201. Do-Right Auto Sales, 429 U.S. 917.
202. Petitions for certiorari in cases where certiorari was denied are generally available from
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thirty-five other cases have presented the unpublication issue when seeking
certiorari.203 None were granted.204 Each of those thirty-five petitions
challenged the constitutionality of the unpublication practice directly as a
question presented for certiorari, though on a varying array of grounds and
with varied depths of analyses. 205 Nine of the thirty-five challenged state
1995 forward, though some earlier petitions have been published.
203. Untracht Petition, supra note 14; Spiegel Petition, supra note 14; Canatella Petition, supra
note 14; Family Fare Petition, supra note 14; Wheeler Petition, supra note 14; Stilley Petition, supra
note 14; Shefchuk Petition, supra note 14; N. Pacifica Petition, supra note 14; Heavrin Petition,
supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition I, supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition II, supra note 14; Rana Petition,
supra note 14; Seils Petition, supra note 14; Zimmerman Petition, supra note 14; Schmier III
Petition, supra note 14; Rodriguez Petition, supra note 14; Carey Petition, supra note 14; Test Reply
Brief, supra note 14; Martin Petition, supra note 14; Berrafato Petition, supra note 14; S. Clay Prods.
Petition, supra note 14; Lewin Petition, supra note 14; Lemelson Med. Petition, supra note 14; Alcan
Aluminum Petition, supra note 14; Wendt Petition, supra note 14; Mims Petition, supra note 14;
Pappas Petition, supra note 14; Segal Petition, supra note 14; Bostron Petition, supra note 14; Knight
Petition, supra note 14; Smyly Petition, supra note 14; Schmier II Petition, supra note 14; Culp
Petition, supra note 14; Litton Sys. Petition, supra note 14; Friedman Petition, supra note 14; Van
Sant Petition, supra note 14.
204. Untracht v. Fikri, 128 S. Ct. 1666 (2008); Spiegel v. Volvo Cars N. Am., L.L.C., 128 S.
Ct. 911 (2008); Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 128 S. Ct. 669 (2007); Family Fare, Inc. v. NLRB, 127
S. Ct. 2991 (2007); Wheeler v. Mo. Dir. of Revenue, 549 U.S. 1266 (2007); Stilley v. Marschewski,
549 U.S. 1112 (2007); Shefchuk v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 549 U.S. 952 (2006); N. Pacifica L.L.C. v.
City of Pacifica, 546 U.S. 1138 (2006); Heavrin v. Schilling, 546 U.S. 1137 (2006); O.S.C. Co. v.
Zymblosky, 546 U.S. 936 (2005); Rana v. United States, 546 U.S. 877 (2005); Seils v. Rochester
City Sch. Dist., 544 U.S. 920 (2005); Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 543 U.S. 819 (2004); Schmier
v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 543 U.S. 818 (2004); Rodriguez v. HFP, Inc., 541 U.S. 903 (2004); Carey v.
Knox County, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004); Test v. Comm‘r, 538 U.S. 961 (2003); Martin v. KeyCorp, 538
U.S. 961 (2003); Berrafato v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 537 U.S. 1233 (2003);
S. Clay Prods., Inc. v. United Catalysts, Inc., 537 U.S. 1189 (2003); Lewin v. Cooke, 537 U.S. 881
(2002); Lemelson Med. v. Symbol Techs., 537 U.S. 825 (2002); Alcan Aluminum Corp. v.
Prudential Assurance Co., 536 U.S. 959 (2002); Wendt v. Mineta, 536 U.S. 941 (2002); Mims v.
United States, 534 U.S. 1132 (2002); Pappas v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 534 U.S. 1129 (2002); Segal v.
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 534 U.S. 1041 (2001); Bostron v. Massanari, 534 U.S. 896 (2001); Knight
v. Maleng, 534 U.S. 820 (2001); Smyly v. IBM, 528 U.S. 982 (1999); Schmier v. Jennings, 522 U.S.
1149 (1998); Culp v. Hood, 519 U.S. 1042 (1996); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Carroll, 516 U.S. 816 (1995);
Friedman v. Montgomery County, 489 U.S. 1079 (1989); Van Sant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 475 U.S.
1082 (1986), reh’g denied, 476 U.S. 1131 (1986).
205. Untracht Petition, supra note 14; Spiegel Petition, supra note 14; Canatella Petition, supra
note 14; Family Fare Petition, supra note 14; Wheeler Petition, supra note 14; Stilley Petition, supra
note 14; Shefchuk Petition, supra note 14; N. Pacifica Petition, supra note 14; Heavrin Petition,
supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition I, supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition II, supra note 14; Rana Petition,
supra note 14; Seils Petition, supra note 14; Zimmerman Petition, supra note 14; Schmier III
Petition, supra note 14; Rodriguez Petition, supra note 14; Carey Petition, supra note 14; Test Reply
Brief, supra note 14; Martin Petition, supra note 14; Berrafato Petition, supra note 14; S. Clay Prods.
Petition, supra note 14; Lewin Petition, supra note 14; Lemelson Med. Petition, supra note 14; Alcan
Aluminum Petition, supra note 14; Wendt Petition, supra note 14; Mims Petition, supra note 14;
Pappas Petition, supra note 14; Segal Petition, supra note 14; Bostron Petition, supra note 14; Knight
Petition, supra note 14; Smyly Petition, supra note 14; Schmier II Petition, supra note 14; Culp
Petition, supra note 14; Litton Sys. Petition, supra note 14; Friedman Petition, supra note 14; Van
Sant Petition, supra note 14.
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court unpublication practices,206 and twenty-six addressed the rules of the
federal circuit courts of appeals.207 All but one of the petitions presented
claims that the lower court‘s failure to publish its decision in that case
violated constitutional protections, 208 and the outlier was a case seeking
declaratory judgment that California‘s limited publication/citation bar rule
was unconstitutional based on alleged wrongs in other cases. 209 The
constitutional protection most asserted was due process (twenty-four cases), 210
followed by equal protection (thirteen cases).211 Only ten cases made a core

206. Spiegel Petition, supra note 14; Wheeler Petition, supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition I, supra
note 14; O.S.C. Petition II, supra note 14; N. Pacifica Petition, supra note 14; Schmier III Petition,
supra note 14; Alcan Aluminum Petition, supra note 14; Schmier II, supra note 14; Culp Petition,
supra note 14; Friedman Petition, supra note 14.
207. Untracht Petition, supra note 14; Canatella Petition, supra note 14; Family Fare Petition,
supra note 14; Stilley Petition, supra note 14; Shefchuk Petition, supra note 14; Heavrin Petition,
supra note 14; Rana Petition, supra note 14; Seils Petition, supra note 14; Zimmerman Petition,
supra note 14; Rodriguez Petition, supra note 14; Carey Petition, supra note 14; Test Reply Brief,
supra note 14; Martin Petition, supra note 14; S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14; Berrafato
Petition, supra note 14; Lewin Petition, supra note 14; Lemelson Med. Petition, supra note 14;
Wendt Petition, supra note 14; Mims Petition, supra note 14; Pappas Petition, supra note 14; Segal
Petition, supra note 14; Bostron Petition, supra note 14; Knight Petition, supra note 14; Smyly
Petition, supra note 14; Litton Sys. Petition, supra note 14; Van Sant Petition, supra note 14.
208. Untracht Petition, supra note 14; Spiegel Petition, supra note 14; Canatella Petition, supra
note 14; Family Fare Petition, supra note 14; Wheeler Petition, supra note 14; Stilley Petition, supra
note 14; Shefchuk Petition, supra note 14; N. Pacifica Petition, supra note 14; Heavrin Petition,
supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition I, supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition II, supra note 14; Rana Petition,
supra note 14; Seils Petition, supra note 14; Zimmerman Petition, supra note 14; Rodriguez Petition,
supra note 14; Carey Petition, supra note 14; Test Reply Brief, supra note 14; Martin Petition, supra
note 14; Berrafato Petition, supra note 14; S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14; Lewin Petition,
supra note 14; Lemelson Med. Petition, supra note 14; Alcan Aluminum Petition, supra note 14;
Wendt Petition, supra note 14; Mims Petition, supra note 14; Pappas Petition, supra note 14; Segal
Petition, supra note 14; Bostron Petition, supra note 14; Knight Petition, supra note 14; Smyly
Petition, supra note 14; Schmier II, supra note 14; Culp Petition, supra note 14; Litton Sys. Petition,
supra note 14; Friedman Petition, supra note 14; Van Sant Petition, supra note 14.
209. Schmier III Petition, supra note 14.
210. Spiegel Petition, supra note 14; Family Fare Petition, supra note 14; Wheeler Petition,
supra note 14; Stilley Petition, supra note 14; Shefchuk Petition, supra note 14; N. Pacifica Petition,
supra note 14; Heavrin Petition, supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition I, supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition II,
supra note 14; Rana Petition, supra note 14; Seils Petition, supra note 14; Zimmerman Petition,
supra note 14; Schmier III Petition, supra note 14; Rodriguez Petition, supra note 14; Martin
Petition, supra note 14; S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14; Lewin Petition, supra note 14;
Lemelson Med. Petition, supra note 14; Alcan Aluminum Petition, supra note 14; Segal Petition,
supra note 14; Bostron Petition, supra note 14; Culp Petition, supra note 14; Litton Sys. Petition,
supra note 14; Friedman Petition, supra note 14; Van Sant Petition, supra note 14.
211. Untracht Petition, supra note 14; Family Fare Petition, supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition I,
supra note 14; O.S.C. Petition II, supra note 14; Schmier III Petition, supra note 14; Rodriguez
Petition, supra note 14; Carey Petition, supra note 14; S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14; Alcan
Aluminum Petition, supra note 14; Wendt Petition, supra note 14; Bostron Petition, supra note 14;
Smyly Petition, supra note 14; Schmier II Petition, supra note 14; Culp Petition, supra note 14.
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Article III claim, 212 and only three of the thirty-five significant petitions relied
on the First Amendment.213
1. Cases Unlikely to Gain Certiorari on the Unpublication Issue
The thirty-five petitions noted above vary widely in their approaches, and
some seem particularly doomed for failure in bringing the unpublished
opinion issue before the Court. These petitions ranged from the accusatory
and impassioned, 214 to the vague,215 to relatively cursory (at least in regard to
the unpublished opinion issue or the constitutional analyses).216 An example

212. Canatella Petition, supra note 14; Family Fare Petition, supra note 14; Heavrin Petition,
supra note 14; Schmier III Petition, supra note 14; Rodriguez Petition, supra note 14; Carey Petition,
supra note 14; Berrafato Petition, supra note 14; Mims Petition, supra note 14; Pappas Petition,
supra note 14; Knight Petition, supra note 14.
213. Zimmerman Petition, supra note 14, at 24; Schmier III Petition, supra note 14, at 13
(arguing that the restriction of citing unpublished opinions violates free speech); S. Clay Prods.
Petition, supra note 14, at 18–19. Under the present reality of published ―unpublished‖ opinions and
free citation under FRAP 32.1, First Amendment arguments based on a right to know or speak would
likely be irrelevant in the federal system. However, the First Amendment ―right to access‖ argument
advanced in Southern Clay Products, Inc. retains viability.
214. Rodriguez Petition, supra note 14, at 7 n.6 (―Because the surreal nature of the unpublished
decisions provided a prima facie case of political skullduggery, Rodriguez filed a Judicial Complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 372, CA4C No. 02-9008, against the various federal judges for acting outside of
their jurisdiction.‖); Alcan Aluminum Petition, supra note 14, at 2, 5, 7 (―For example, in this case,
the trial and appellate court actually construct an economic penalty against Alcan for exercising its
right to appeal. They do this because both courts share a mutual dislike for California state law
which they are obliged to follow in this diversity action but refuse to do so. They do not disclose
their conduct, but attempt to bury it in the shadows of a NPO. . . . The reality is that the inferior
courts have used NPOs to disguise the fact that they have blatantly ignored explicit precedent of this
Court. They have used it to hide the fact that their holdings created clear disputes between the
Circuits on pre-Victorian statements by this Court, and that they are again disregarding clear state
law. . . . Precedent can change, but it must do so rationally, visibly and PERMIT EVERYONE TO
BENEFIT FROM THE CHANGE.‖); Culp Petition, supra note 14, at 29, 30, 35, 45 (containing
accusations of ―repeated occurrences of judicial decisions being fixed,‖ a comparison to Watergate, a
certain conclusion being called ―asinine,‖ and a conclusion of ―E tu [sic] Rehnquist? Stevens?
O‘Connor? Scalia? Kennedy? Souter? Thomas? Ginsburg? Breyer?‖).
215. Shefchuk Petition, supra note 14, at 10 (never using the terms ―due process‖ or ―equal
protection‖ nor their analytical requirements and discussing only ―rational system‖ and ―fairness‖);
Wendt Petition, supra note 14, at 13 (a pro se petition mentioning the unpublished opinion debate for
an inscrutable reason); Bostron Petition, supra note 14, at ii, 4–12 (raising the issue in the questions
presented but completely ignoring it elsewhere in the petition).
216. Untracht Petition, supra note 14, at 34–35 (pro se petition seeking review on the
unpublished opinion issue by reciting concerns of both scholars and Supreme Court Justices, but only
as a fallback preferable to summary dismissal, and using hyperbolic phrases like ―this Court bears the
ultimate responsibility to defend the Constitution against such mockery and rape‖); Spiegel Petition,
supra note 14, at 4 (mentioning unpublished opinions in the larger context of the possibility of an
improper decision rendered by law clerks and without oral argument); Canatella Petition, supra note
14, at 14–19 (the underlying matter does not even involve any unpublished cases, but the petitioner
analogizes the lower court‘s alleged failure to follow precedent to the exceeding of judicial power
referenced in Anastasoff); Stilley Petition, supra note 14, at 5–7 (claiming due process was violated
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of one such case, which invoked the unpublished opinion system as a problem
but then did not directly address it, was Van Sant v. United States Postal
Service.217 In Van Sant, the petition challenged the unpublished decision of
the Fourth Circuit below as the second of two issues on appeal. 218 However,
despite being one of only two issues on which certiorari was sought, the
discussion of the issue was minimal. 219 The issue accounted for just under
five of the petition‘s forty-six pages and relied upon only one authority—a
D.C. Circuit Advisory Committee on Procedures to the U.S. Court of Appeals
report.220 The petition contained no analysis on any constitutional claim.
Similarly, in Stilley v. Marschewski, the petition made only a bare claim that
the lower court‘s disposition via unpublished opinion violates due process. 221
The petition did not set forth an analysis supporting its conclusion or cite to
any authority on the constitutional issue. 222 Moreover, even in the discussion
of the unpublished circuit court decision, the primary complaint seems not to
be the lack of publication but that the lower court did not address all the
petitioner‘s points on appeal. 223 Whatever these cases‘ prospects of gaining
certiorari on other issues, they had little chance of bringing the unpublished
opinion issue to the forefront of the Court‘s attention.

by the circuit court‘s failure to address all his points on appeal); N. Pacifica Petition, supra note 14,
at 27–28 (raising the fact that the lower court decision was unpublished as a pejorative without
substantially arguing against such decisions); Heavrin Petition, supra note 14, at 25–30 (making a
well-written, but brief, constitutional argument following an extensive and intricate bankruptcy law
analysis); Rana Petition, supra note 14, at 5 & n.4 (seeking review under Sup. Ct. R. 10(a), which
allows certiorari when a circuit court ―has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this
Court‘s supervisory power‖ and mentioning due process only in passing); Carey Petition, supra note
14, at 22 (mentioning the issue only briefly and relying upon Anastasoff as the only authority on the
issue two years after that case‘s vacation); Martin Petition, supra note 14, at 7–17 (addressing the
unpublished opinion precedent issue fairly directly, but only among additional arguments about law
clerks, judicial ghostwriting, and publication rules and without analysis of the governing due process
and equal protection standards); Segal Petition, supra note 14, at 18–20 (identifying the problem but
including no constitutional analysis); Friedman Petition, supra note 14, at 31–36 (arguing that the
state courts‘ nonpublication of litigants‘ prior cases was arbitrary and briefly mentioning due
process); Van Sant Petition, supra note 14, at 43–46 (relying in this appeal from the Fourth Circuit
on only a D.C. Circuit committee report).
217. Van Sant Petition, supra note 14, at 15, 41–46.
218. Id. at ii.
219. Id. at 41–46.
220. Id. at 43–44.
221. Stilley Petition, supra note 14, at 5–7.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 7 (claiming due process was violated by the circuit court‘s failure to address all his
points on appeal).
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2. Promising Petitions for Certiorari on the Unpublication Issue
Several of the thirty-five petitions seemed more promising but were
ultimately unsuccessful. Two such cases presented primarily the very narrow
claim that the circuit courts‘ failures to publish their decisions below reduced
the likelihood of direct review. 224 These cases claimed that by not publishing
the decisions below, the intermediate appellate courts reduced the petitioners‘
chances for review by the states‘ highest courts.225 Such a factually intensive
claim, brought without significant factual support, against a state court system
was understandably unappealing to the Court.226 Other cases presented the
unpublished opinion issue directly but quite briefly or without fully
elucidating the constitutional analyses.227 For example, the petition in
Lemelson Medical v. Symbol Technologies noted that the Federal Circuit
below, in an unpublished opinion, departed from prior published opinions of
the circuit and then discussed the national debate in the wake of Anastasoff
and the Supreme Court‘s recent concern with due process. 228 But this
argument is clearly secondary to the substantive argument that the circuit
court erred on the merits.229
Another relatively promising case, Schmier v. Supreme Court of
California,230 technically involved two cases: an action for injunctive relief 231
and a declaratory judgment action based on alleged infringement of
constitutional rights in the underlying action. 232 Both essentially argued that
California‘s unpublication scheme stifles protected First Amendment speech
by barring citation and violates due process and equal protection guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment by allowing for ―unbridled exercise of raw

224. Wheeler Petition, supra note 14; Schmier II Petition, supra note 14.
225. Wheeler Petition, supra note 14, at 13–16; Schmier II Petition, supra note 14, at 13–14.
226. Cf. SUP. CT. R. 10 (noting that the Court does not take cases primarily for error correction
or on issues of state law application).
227. Seils Petition, supra note 14, at 2–21, 21–25 (containing over twenty pages of factual
argument and less than four pages of fairly general due process allegations regarding unpublished
opinions); Lemelson Med. Petition, supra note 14, at 26–28 (arguing briefly that the unpublished
nature of the circuit court decision prevents review of the erroneous decision below); Mims Petition,
supra note 14, at 12–15 (noting that circuit rules on unpublished opinions vary and referencing the
recent Anastasoff opinion‘s Article III argument with minimal analysis); Knight Petition, supra note
14, at 14–18 (relying upon Anastasoff with little additional analysis); Smyly Petition, supra note 14,
at 8–10 (pro se petition raising the issue of unfairness and extra-judicial acts).
228. Lemelson Med. Petition, supra note 14, at 26–28.
229. Id. (including a three-page discussion of the issue at the end of a thirty-page petition that
extensively details the underlying claim).
230. 543 U.S. 818 (2004).
231. Schmier v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 531 U.S. 958 (2000); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Schmier,
531 U.S. 958 (No. 00-302), 2000 WL 33999285 [hereinafter Schmier I Petition].
232. Schmier, 543 U.S. 818; Schmier III Petition, supra note 14.
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governmental power.‖233
Schmier I, the 2000 petition, argued that
nonpublication rules allow courts to create a system of ―selective
prospectivity‖; that is, the courts impermissibly violate an individual‘s due
process or equal protection rights by treating the individual differently than
other similarly situated litigants. 234 The petition also argued that prohibitions
on citation to court opinions represented unlawful prior restraint on free
speech.235 Schmier II was an appeal regarding attorneys‘ fees sought after
Schmier I, which gave rise to further complaints about California‘s
unpublication rules. 236 Schmier III, the 2004 petition, addressed alleged
violations in both Schmier I and II. 237 The petition for certiorari in Schmier III
echoed the arguments from Schmier I in part but argued the First Amendment
point almost exclusively. 238 Both cases were dismissed by the lower courts
for either lack of standing or lack of merit on the constitutional issue. 239 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari, for reasons known only to the Court itself,
though several factors may have militated against certiorari. First, the
underlying nature of the case was a challenge to state court rules brought by
petitioner on his own behalf (and behalf of all those similarly situated). 240
Second, Schmier I at least was denied below based on lack of standing, a
determination under state law.241 Finally, while written with great passion,
neither petition fully set forth the constitutional arguments mentioned in the
Questions Presented section of the brief nor hewed closely to the extant
Supreme Court tests for such claims.
3. Particularly Thorough or Compelling Petitions
Finally, five of these thirty-five significant petitions presented particularly
clear, thorough, and well-pled challenges to the nonpublication of opinions.
First, though relying only on the core Article III argument, Pappas v. UNUM
233. Schmier I Petition, supra note 231, at 8; see also Schmier III Petition, supra note 14, at
13.
234. Schmier I Petition, supra note 231, at 10–15.
235. Id. at 16–18.
236. Schmier III Petition, supra note 14, at 6.
237. Id. at 5–6.
238. Schmier III Petition, supra note 14.
239. See Schmier v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 583–84, 585–86 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000) (holding Schmier lacked standing and that the court‘s standards for publication prevent
―selective prospectivity‖); Schmier v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., No. A101206, 2003 WL 22954266 (Cal. Ct.
App. Dec. 16, 2003) (unpublished/noncitable) (holding Schmier‘s First Amendment argument
without merit).
240. Schmier III Petition, supra note 14, at 7.
241. Schmier‘s claim was not that the lack of standing was incorrect but that California‘s
nonpublication and noncitation rule violated rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 11–14.
Still, the case involved a challenge to state law administrative rules and a state law determination that
the case did not belong before the court. Id.
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Life Insurance Co. of America made both the usual claim of wrongly applied
precedent via unpublished opinion and detailed the judicial and scholarly
concern with the practice of denying the precedent of unpublished opinions
and the wide range of circuit rules on the issue. 242 The petition made clear
that this is a fundamental issue of national concern—usually a plus in gaining
certiorari, though it was unsuccessful here.243
Second, in Lewin v. Cooke, the appellant Lewin presented a very
straightforward claim that the issuance of unpublished opinions violated due
process.244 Lewin argued that allowing circuit courts to issue unpublished
opinions: (1) allows circuits to contradict the Supreme Court or themselves;
(2) effectively denies the litigant of further review given the small percentage
of en banc motions and petitions for certiorari granted; and (3) lessens the
public‘s confidence in, and regard for, the federal judiciary.245 Lewin did not
argue for the publication of all opinions but only the narrower subset of cases,
which he called the ―disobedient‖ opinions—those opinions in which the
circuit deviated from settled Supreme Court or circuit law.246 Lewin proposed
that the aggrieved party serve as the arbiter of which opinions fit into that
subset and that upon decision of that party the opinion would be published. 247
Lewin argued that the losing party should have the right to insist upon
publication in the name of due process to facilitate further review:
Publication upon an appellant‘s request seems like a modest
and minimal safe guard, doing no harm if the appellant‘s fears
are misguided. If the inclusion of a few extra pages in a
Federal Reporter can help to guarantee the integrity of the
appellate process and sustain public confidence in that
process against the suspicion of possible abuse, then the
minimal cost should be well worth it. By asserting such a
deterrent due process right, parties should be able to reinforce
the sovereignty of this Court when that sovereignty is
undermined by disobedience cloaked in abuses of
nonpublication.248

242. Pappas Petition, supra note 14.
243. Id. at 10–11 (―Not only is the escalating practice of issuing non-precedential opinions of
concern to the bench and to legal scholars, it also is a matter of fundamental importance to litigants
such as petitioner.‖). A similar argument was made in Berrafato Petition, supra note 14, at 24–30.
244. Lewin Petition, supra note 14, at 6–18. A similar due process argument was raised in
Litton Systems, Inc. v. Carroll. Litton Sys. Petition, supra note 14, at 14–21.
245. Lewin Petition, supra note 14, at 6–18.
246. Id. at 14.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 17–18.
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It is difficult to see how this narrower remedy could work, though; few
losing litigants, aside from repeat litigants seeking to avoid a ―bad‖ precedent,
would prefer an unpublished opinion to a published one. Moreover, the
litigant has no basis for determining what ―disobedient‖ means; presumably,
the vast majority of litigants believe the court to be disobedient to the
controlling law whenever the court rules against them. Discerning the reason
for denial, which coincidentally may be merely a function of volume, is
difficult at best. Perhaps the problem is that while Lewin presents the due
process challenge to the unpublication system directly, it does not do so in the
analytical terms commonly used by the Court. So, though the challenge is
clear and direct, it is not in the language of a due process challenge and
proposes a solution that is probably untenable.
Third, in O.S.C. Co. v. Zymblosky, O.S.C. Co. challenged the lower
courts‘ decisions to invalidate its deeds without a jury trial, claiming that the
lower courts acted in an unpublished opinion contrary to clear published
authority. 249 The crux of that equal protection claim was that the
Pennsylvania courts‘ internal operating procedure permitting unpublished
opinions allowed the courts below to treat O.S.C.‘s claim differently than
similarly situated parties. 250 While it is well-established that an incorrect
decision by a court is not a constitutional violation, 251 O.S.C. claimed that the
problem extended beyond mere misapplication of the law to a procedure that
permitted, without recourse, the abandonment of governing precedent. 252 The
respondent, Zymblosky, argued that O.S.C.‘s complaint was: (1) in error on
the substantive law; (2) a complaint about mere misapplication of the law; and
(3) contrary to a recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decision approving the
internal operating procedure in question. 253 While it is impossible to know
what persuaded the Supreme Court to deny certiorari, it seems likely that the
fact that it was a state court internal operating procedure, combined with the
fact that the Pennsylvania courts had recently found the practice acceptable
under the Pennsylvania Constitution,254 may have deterred the Supreme Court
from granting certiorari.
Fourth, in Southern Clay Products, Inc. v. United Catalysts, Inc., the
Court was presented with an interesting challenge to the Federal Circuit‘s
combination of precedent-denying and en banc restricting rules. 255 Southern
249. O.S.C. Petition II, supra note 14, at 7–10.
250. Id.
251. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 554–55 (1962).
252. O.S.C. Petition II, supra note 14, at 12–17.
253. Brief in Opposition at 7–10, O.S.C. Co. v. Zymblosky, 546 U.S. 936 (2005) (No. 05-156),
2005 WL 2104235.
254. Schaaf v. Kaufman, 850 A.2d 655, 658–59 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
255. S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14.
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Clay Products, Inc. had its eighty million dollar trial verdict overturned by the
Federal Circuit over the vigorous dissent of the Chief Judge. 256 Southern Clay
then petitioned the Supreme Court for review armed with several factors in its
favor. First, the case was a challenge to federal court rules based on federal
constitutional law. 257 Second, the Federal Circuit had rules explicitly denying
unpublished opinions precedential value258 and virtually required a
precedential opinion to gain en banc review,259 which effectively shielded the
Federal Circuit‘s panel decisions from further review. 260 Third, Southern
Clay‘s petition was brought following both a favorable jury determination and
the Federal Circuit Chief Judge‘s dissent to vacation of that jury verdict. 261
Southern Clay‘s petition presented a well-organized and somewhat detailed
argument claiming that the whipsaw of Federal Circuit rules violates the First
Amendment right of access to the courts262 and the Fifth Amendment rights of
due process and equal protection. 263 The petition included significant
authority demonstrating that Southern Clay‘s access to the courts, and the
manner in which the rules regarding unpublished opinions, violate those
rights.264 It also argued that by deciding its case by unpublished opinion, in
contravention of the circuit‘s established precedent, the Federal Circuit
effectively removed Southern Clay‘s due process right to rely upon precedent
and created a class of one in contravention of equal protection. 265 This
petition seemed to present a strong case for certiorari under Supreme Court
Rule 10(a), its only immediately apparent weakness being its intra-circuit,
rather than inter-circuit, nature; yet, it was denied.
Finally, the most clear, direct, and complete challenge to the federal
courts‘ practice of issuing unpublished opinions was made in the recent case
of Family Fare, Inc. v. NLRB.266 In this case, the petitioner, Family Fare, Inc.,
claimed that the Sixth Circuit‘s unpublished decision in the case overruled

256. S. Clay Prods., Inc. v. United Catalysts, Inc., 43 Fed. Appx. 379 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also
S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14, at 9–12.
257. S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14, at 14–25.
258. FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b) (2001), superseded by FED. CIR. R. 32.1 (2006).
259. FED. CIR. R. 35(b)(2).
260. S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14, at 5.
261. S. Clay Prods, Inc., 43 Fed. Appx. at 389 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting) (―The issue of
infringement was fully presented to the jury who returned a verdict of willful infringement against
United. United‘s only defenses were invalidity or unenforceability and because it cannot prove the
elements of those defenses, I respectfully dissent.‖).
262. S. Clay Prods. Petition, supra note 14, at 18.
263. Id. at 19–22.
264. Id. at 18–19.
265. Id. at 19–22; Reply to Brief in Opposition at 5–7, S. Clay Prods, Inc. v. United Catalysts,
Inc., 537 U.S. 1189 (2003) (No. 02-848), 2003 WL 21698023.
266. Family Fare Petition, supra note 14.
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and conflicted with its prior published decisions, thus violating Family Fare‘s
due process and equal protection rights and exceeding the court‘s judicial
power under Article III of the United States Constitution. 267 The underlying
case involved Family Fare‘s challenge to the ―validity of a union election
based on objectionable conduct by statutory supervisors under the National
Labor Relations Act (―NLRA‖).‖268 Family Fare explained that the Sixth
Circuit‘s published standard held that ―‗[t]he party challenging the election
need not introduce proof of actual coercion,‘‖269 and the Sixth Circuit panel‘s
unpublished opinion in this case held, ―[s]ome showing of coercion is
required to sustain a finding of objectionable conduct.‖270 Under Sixth Circuit
Rule 206(c): ―Reported panel opinions are binding on subsequent panels.
Thus, no subsequent panel overrules a published opinion of a previous panel.
Court en banc consideration is required to overrule a published opinion of the
court.‖271 Thus, what the Sixth Circuit panel in Family Fare did was one of
two things, both of which violated Family Fare‘s constitutional rights. Either
the panel departed from the published legal standard in a way that did not alter
the published law of the circuit, effectively treating Family Fare differently
than all other similarly situated parties before and after this decision, or it
altered published law of the circuit contrary to rule 206(c).272 Family Fare
seemed concerned that it was the former and that ―[t]he Sixth Circuit has
subjected the election here to a legal standard different than the one that
applies in every other comparable union election case in the Sixth Circuit‖; 273
whereas, the NLRB seemed to view the case as the latter, an alteration of the
governing law, as evidenced by its motion to the Sixth Circuit to publish the
case as one that ―‗sets a framework for addressing an issue of considerable
importance to the labor bar and provides much-needed guidance on a new
approach to what previously [has] been an area of dispute between the Board
and the Sixth Circuit.‘‖274 Either the Sixth Circuit treated Family Fare
differently, violating its equal protection rights, or it departed from its
precedent without reason or justification and without following its own
process for departing from a panel decision, thereby failing to afford Family
Fare due process.

267. Id. at i.
268. Id. at 3.
269. Id. at 4 (quoting Harborside Healthcare, Inc. v. NLRB, 230 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2000);
Evergreen Healthcare, Inc. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 867, 874 (6th Cir. 1997)).
270. Id.
271. 6TH CIR. R. 206(c).
272. Family Fare seemed concerned with the former—that it was being treated differently than
every other comparable employer.
273. Family Fare Petition, supra note 14, at 6.
274. Id. at 6–7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting NLRB‘s motion for publication).
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The petition set forth clear and cogent arguments for the
unconstitutionality of the unpublication practice as applied to Family Fare‘s
case.275 It organized both its equal protection and due process arguments
according to the relevant constitutional tests and made reasonable claims that
those tests were met.276 Additionally, the petition for certiorari challenged the
circuit court‘s constitutional authority to issue unpublished, nonprecedential
opinions.277 Its argument on this point relied on the analysis in Anastasoff and
noted the weight of scholarly and judicial authority siding with that
analysis.278 The petition‘s own analysis on this point was minimal, relying
largely on the readers‘ understanding of the debate referenced in the cited
authorities. In addition to its well-organized and argued constitutional claims,
this petition very clearly set forth a justification for granting certiorari:
―Review by this Court is required to protect the parties‘ constitutional rights
and to provide guidance to all Circuit Courts of Appeal that face the problem
of panel decisions that circumvent binding published authority in conflict with
their own rules.‖279 This case seemed a good one for review; it challenged the
federal rules and practice, involved wholly federal case law, set forth
thorough claims of constitutional violations tracking the relevant tests ably,
and rhetorically made a persuasive case for the need for review. Moreover,
both parties appeared to have agreed on the underlying nature of the
unpublished case, that is, that the unpublished case deviated from prior
published circuit authority.
This deviation from published authority, as well as the possibility that
unpublished decisions may be evading review, had been mentioned before in
the dissents to several denials of certiorari. 280 One such dissent read:
The fact that the Court of Appeals‘ opinion is unpublished is
irrelevant. Nonpublication must not be a convenient means to
prevent review. An unpublished opinion may have a

275. Id. at 14–27.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 27–29.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 5.
280. Langston v. United States, 506 U.S. 930, 930 (1992) (White & Thomas, JJ., dissenting);
Costa v. United States, 506 U.S. 929, 929 (1992) (White & O‘Connor, JJ., dissenting); Waller v.
United States, 504 U.S. 962, 962–65 (1992) (White & O‘Connor, JJ., dissenting); Smith v. United
States, 502 U.S. 1017, 1017–20 (1991) (Blackmun, O‘Connor & Souter, JJ., dissenting); St. Louis
S.W. Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry., 484 U.S. 907, 907 (1987) (White & Brennan, JJ., dissenting);
Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 965–72 (1983) (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting); Hyman v. Rickman, 446 U.S. 989, 989–92 (1980) (Blackmun, Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting) (all dissenting opinions finding circuit split based on at least one unpublished opinion).
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lingering effect in the Circuit and surely is as important to the
parties concerned as is a published opinion. 281
Yet, the Court in 2007 was unwilling to take up the issue in Family Fare,
Inc. Still, other comments from the Court over the years demonstrate that the
practice of unpublished opinions does not sit well with the Court,282 that the
Court recognizes the potential for abuse,283 and even that the Court does not
fully accept the assertion that they are nonprecedential. 284
C. Supreme Court Comments in Other Cases
While the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
constitutionality or propriety of the unpublication system, it has mentioned the
practice, often with great skepticism, in the course of deciding cases on other
issues. These cases can be grouped into three categories. First, there are a
number of cases in which the Court cited to or mentioned unpublished
opinions. For example, there are a half-dozen cases in which the Court cited
to the Federal Appendix specifically285 and numerous cases in which the
Court referred to an unpublished decision below.286
Second, and more probative, are a number of cases in which the Court
granted certiorari because an unpublished decision was in conflict with a
published decision.287 For example, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
281. Smith, 502 U.S. at 1020 n.* (mem.) (Blackmun, O‘Connor & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
282. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 425 n.3 (1993) (―We deem it remarkable
and unusual that although the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment that an Act of Congress was
unconstitutional as applied, the court found it appropriate to announce its judgment in an unpublished
per curiam opinion.‖).
283. County of L.A. v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936, 937–40 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―As this
Court‘s summary disposition today demonstrates, the Court of Appeals would have been well
advised to discuss the record in greater depth. . . . That decision not to publish the opinion or permit
it to be cited—like the decision to promulgate a rule spawning a body of secret law—was plainly
wrong.‖).
284. Comm‘r v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987) (―The Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction
regardless of nonpublication and regardless of any assumed lack of precedential effect of a ruling that
is unpublished.‖).
285. Sole v. Wyner, 1274 S. Ct. 2188, 2194 (2007); Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 151, 152,
153 (2007); Domino‘s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 474 (2006); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S.
668, 687 (2004); Cruz-Osornio v. United States, 540 U.S. 1131, 1131 (2004); Pacheco-Zepeda v.
United States, 532 U.S. 966, 966 (2001).
286. E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 61 (2000); Johnson v.
United States, 529 U.S. 694, 699 n.3 (2000); Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 436 (1997); Old Chief
v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 177 (1997); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 106 (1995); Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,
452–53 (1993); Terrell v. Morris, 493 U.S. 1, 3 (1989); Comm’r, 484 U.S. at 7.
287. E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 61; Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 177–78; Lynce, 519 U.S.
at 436; Thompson, 516 U.S. at 106; Harris, 510 U.S. at 20; Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 453–54
(―The [unpublished] decision below, and the Lessig line of decisions on which it relies, conflicts with
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involving an abusive work environment claim, the Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict between the Sixth Circuit‘s unpublished decision
(requiring a showing of serious effect on a claimant‘s psychological wellbeing) and the Ninth‘s Circuit‘s contrary rule. 288 The Court‘s taking of these
cases suggests that it views unpublished opinions as precedential and capable
of causing conflict in the law. The Supreme Court does not take cases for the
purpose of correcting errors in a single case but to resolve inter-circuit conflict
or important national issues. 289 If, as most circuit court rules suggest, 290
unpublished decisions are without precedential value, then there would be no
chance of affecting the state of the law and no need to correct the error in a
single case. Instead, the Court has granted certiorari to resolve the conflicts
caused by these unpublished decisions.
Third, there is a single case in which the Court‘s majority opinion directly
mentioned the issue of unpublished opinions. 291 In Commissioner v. McCoy,
the Supreme Court ruled that the court of appeals exceeded its jurisdictional
authority and noted that it would not accept the premise that the unpublished
circuit court decision was unreviewable or nonprecedential:
We note in passing that the fact that the Court of Appeals‘
order under challenge here is unpublished carries no weight in
our decision to review the case. The Court of Appeals
exceeded its jurisdiction regardless of nonpublication and
regardless of any assumed lack of precedential effect of a
ruling that is unpublished. 292
Beyond this single direct reference, there is little in the Court‘s
jurisprudence dealing with unpublished opinions as an issue. 293 However,

holdings of courts in other Circuits. . . . We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict among the
Circuits. We reverse.‖ (citation omitted)).
288. Harris, 510 U.S. at 20.
289. SUP. CT. R. 10.
290. See Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie Wallace Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules
Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions: An Update, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 349, 351–
57 (2004) (citing 1ST CIR. R. 36(b); 2D CIR. R. 0.23; 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.2; 4TH CIR. R. 36(a); 6TH CIR. R.
206(a); 7TH CIR. R. 53(b), (c)(1); 8TH CIR. R. APP. I(4); 9TH CIR. R. 36-1, 36-2; 10TH CIR. R. 36.1,
36.2; 11TH CIR. R. 36-1, 36-2; FED. CIR. R. 47.6(a)).
291. Comm’r, 484 U.S. at 7. The other direct statement about the system itself came in a
dissent from Justice Stevens to a summary reversal of a Ninth Circuit unpublished decision. See
County of L.A. v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936, 937–41 (1985) (criticizing the Supreme Court‘s growing
practice of summary reversals, stating: ―For, like a court of appeals that issues an opinion that may
not be printed or cited, this Court then engages in decision-making without the discipline and
accountability that the preparation of opinions requires‖).
292. Comm’r, 484 U.S. at 7.
293. Though an examination of the Court‘s view of stare decisis, precedent, and original intent
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specific Justices‘ statements in separately authored opinions, scholarly
writings, and public comments may provide further evidence about how the
sitting Court may view the issue and will be addressed in Part V.
V. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES‘ DISPOSITIONS TOWARD THE UNPUBLICATION
PRACTICE
While far less probative of the Court‘s perspective than its prior opinions,
the Justices‘ statements in separately authored opinions, scholarly writings,
and public comments may provide some indication about how the sitting
Court may view the issue of unpublication and whether it might take up the
issue in an upcoming term. Each sitting Justice‘s writings of these types have
been examined to find any comment on the unpublication system.
A. Justice Stevens: Outspoken Critic of the Unpublication System
The most direct and persistent critic of the unpublication system on the
high Court is Justice John Stevens. In 1976, Justice Stevens spoke to the
Illinois State Bar Association regarding the issue, condemning the practice in
its earliest days:
A rule which authorizes any court to censor the future citation
of its own opinions or orders rests on a false premise. Such a
rule assumes that an author is a reliable judge of the quality
and importance of his own work product. If I need authority
to demonstrate the invalidity of that assumption, I refer you to
a citizen of Illinois who gave a brief talk in Gettysburg,
Pennsylvania that he did not expect to be long remembered.
Judges are the last persons who should be authorized to
determine which of their decisions should be long
remembered.294
This statement, made in Justice Stevens‘s first year on the Court,
expresses a fundamental disagreement with the premise of the unpublication
system. He does not appear to have waivered from this position, as evidenced
by his recent comments:
Q: Is the decision to grant or deny cert. influenced by whether
the opinion from the court below is a published or
nonpublished opinion?
on these issues may provide some insights, such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this Article,
which focuses on direct commentary on the unpublished opinion issue.
294. Justice John Paul Stevens, Remarks at the Illinois State Bar Association‘s Centennial
Dinner (Jan. 22, 1977), quoted in Browder Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 177, at 37.
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A [Justice Stevens]: Well, I tend to vote to grant more on
unpublished opinions, on the theory that occasionally judges
will use the unpublished opinion as a device to reach a
decision that might be a little hard to justify.295
Though stated diplomatically, Justice Stevens‘s concern is a serious one
and finds support in a number of recent studies 296 and circuit judges‘
writings. 297 Similarly, in a dissent to a denial of certiorari, Justice Stevens
gently chided the Fifth Circuit for issuing directly contradictory published and
unpublished opinions and noted that while the lack of an inter-circuit conflict
made denial of certiorari technically proper, it worked an injustice on the
petitioner.298
Justice Stevens expressed dismay that the petitioner‘s
unpublished case condemned him to eighteen months in prison whereas the
similarly situated defendant in United States v. Lopez, a case decided two days
after the petitioner‘s, was sentenced to less.299 While acknowledging the
propriety of denial of certiorari, Justice Stevens lamented the system itself:
That, however, is the kind of burden that the individual
litigant must occasionally bear when efficient management is
permitted to displace the careful administration of justice in
295. Jeffrey Cole & Elaine E. Bucklo, A Life Well Lived: An Interview with Justice John Paul
Stevens, 32 LITIG. 8, 67 (2006).
296. Brian P. Brooks, Publishing Unpublished Opinions: A Review of the Federal Appendix, 5
GREEN BAG 259, 260–63 (2d ed. 2002); David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology,
Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV . 817, 820 (2005) (―[V]oting
and publication are, for some judges, strategically intertwined: for example, judges may be prepared
to acquiesce in decisions that run contrary to their own preferences, and to vote with the majority, as
long as the decision remains unpublished, but can be driven to dissent if the majority insists upon
publication.‖); Robert A. Mead, “Unpublished” Opinions as the Bulk of the Iceberg: Publication
Patterns in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals, 93 LAW LIBR. J.
589, 602–03 (2001) (studying publication rates by subject matter in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits
over a six-month period and finding great disparity in publication rates, especially in areas where the
government is a litigant); Merritt & Brudney, supra note 107, at 120 (finding unpublished decisions
are substantive and contain ―a noticeable number of reversals, dissents, or concurrences,‖ and
―significant associations between case outcome and judicial characteristics‖); Wald, supra note 185,
at 1374 (noting a six-month study of D.C. Circuit cases found forty percent of unpublished cases
arguably met the publication standards and noting she believed that percentage to be much higher in
1995); Pamela Foa, Comment, A Snake in the Path of the Law: The Seventh Circuit’s NonPublication Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 309, 315–40 (1977) (citing a six-month study of Seventh
Circuit cases that revealed fifteen percent of unpublished cases were substantively significant and
met the publication standards).
297. See Arnold, supra note 69, at 223 (discussing his concern with strategic decision-making
encouraged by the unpublished opinion system); Wald, supra note 185, at 1374 (discussing her
observations of misuse of unpublished opinions as a judge on the D.C. Circuit).
298. Taylor v. United States, 493 U.S. 906, 906 (1989).
299. Id.
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each case. Perhaps it is not too late for the Court of Appeals
to exercise additional care in the administration of justice in
this case.300
Justice Stevens expressed another concern in his dissent to withdrawal of
certiorari in Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp.,301
a case which challenged the practice of vacating judgments at the behest of
the parties who have come to a separate settlement. In Justice Stevens‘s view,
the Court ought to have decided the case and rejected the practice. 302 He
noted that making decisions disappear, even at the will of the parties, was
contrary to American law: ―Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and
valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property
of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public
interest would be served by a vacatur.‖303 While not dealing with unpublished
opinions specifically, the comment demonstrates a viewpoint regarding the
nature of precedent and litigants‘ right to rely upon what the courts have
previously done.
This same concern is apparent in Justice Stevens‘s dissent in County of
Los Angeles v. Kling.304 In Kling, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
summarily reversed, but Justice Stevens dissented, comparing the majority‘s
failure to examine the case to the troubling practice of issuing unpublished
opinions: ―For, like a court of appeals that issues an opinion that may not be
printed or cited, this Court then engages in decisionmaking without the
discipline and accountability that the preparation of opinions requires.‖305 To
support this view, Justice Stevens quoted Karl Llewellyn:
―In our law the opinion has in addition a central forwardlooking function which reaches far beyond the cause in hand:
the opinion has as one if not its major office to show how like
cases are properly to be decided in the future. This also
frequently casts its shadow before, and affects the deciding of
the cause in hand. (If I cannot give a reason I should be
willing to stand to, I must shrink from the very result which

300. Id. But see Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 165 (1984) (stating
that a lower court‘s interlocutory and summary reversal was in an ―unpublished opinion with no
precedential significance‖).
301. 510 U.S. 27, 34–41 (1993) (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
302. Id.
303. Id. at 40.
304. 474 U.S. 936, 937–40 (1985).
305. Id. at 940.
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otherwise seems good.) Thus the opinion serves as a
steadying factor which aids reckonability.‖ 306
A similar comment, chiding a lower court and expressing concern with both
the Court‘s summary decisions and the lower courts‘ unpublished opinions,
can be found in Board of Education of Rogers, Arkansas v. McCluskey:
In ever-increasing numbers, appeals throughout the federal
system are being decided in this anonymous fashion. It is not
uncommon for courts of appeals to issue opinions that are not
to be cited as authority in other cases. In one recent published
case—which was sufficiently important to induce this Court
to grant certiorari even before a conflict in the circuits had
developed—the court purported to justify such an ad hoc
adjudication by asserting that it lacked ―precedential
character.‖ The threat to the quality of our work that is
presented by the ever-increasing impersonalization and
bureaucratization of the federal judicial system is far more
serious than is generally recognized. Regrettably the example
set by this Court in cases of this kind is not one of resistance,
but rather of encouragement, to the rising administrative
tide. 307
Another, more telling, sign can be seen in Justice Stevens‘s signing on to
a concurring opinion, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, which describes the
Framers‘ understanding of common law judicial decisionmaking in precisely
the same manner as that of Judge Arnold and other critics of the unpublication
system. 308 As noted in Part III, critics of the unpublication system view the
Framers‘ perception of ―judicial power‖ granted by Article III of the U.S.
Constitution as inherently precedent-based. Judge Arnold‘s Anastasoff
decision reviewed the fundamental sources of law known to the Framers, such
as Coke, Blackstone, and Hale, as well as the Framers‘ (both the Federalists‘
and the Anti-Federalists‘) own comments.309 Anastasoff held that Article III
prohibited the issuance of nonprecedential opinions and described our
nation‘s judicial foundations this way:
306. Id. at 940 n.6 (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 26 (1960)).
307. Bd. of Educ. v. McCluskey, 458 U.S. 966, 972 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting with
Brennan & Marshall, JJ.) (internal citations omitted) (reproaching the Second Circuit over its recent
use of an unpublished decision in Rowley v. Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School
District, 632 F.2d 945, 948 n.7 (2d Cir. 1980), rev’d, 458 U.S. 176 (1982)).
308. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 467–81 (2001) (Scalia, Stevens & Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting).
309. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900–04 (8th Cir. 2000).
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Inherent in every judicial decision is a declaration and
interpretation of a general principle or rule of law. This
declaration of law is authoritative to the extent necessary for
the decision, and must be applied in subsequent cases to
similarly situated parties. These principles, which form the
doctrine of precedent, were well established and well
regarded at the time this nation was founded. The Framers of
the Constitution considered these principles to derive from
the nature of judicial power, and intended that they would
limit the judicial power delegated to the courts by Article III
of the Constitution.310
The opinion in Rogers v. Tennessee, signed onto by Justice Stevens, contains
a consonant view of history and the centrality of precedent. 311 For example,
the opinion explains:
The near-dispositive strength Blackstone accorded stare
decisis was not some mere personal predilection. Chancellor
Kent was of the same view: ―If a decision has been made
upon solemn argument and mature deliberation, the
presumption is in favor of its correctness; and the community
have [sic] a right to regard it as a just declaration or
exposition of the law, and to regulate their actions and
contracts by it.‖ See also Hamilton‘s statement in The
Federalist: ―To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules
and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty
in every particular case that comes before them.‖ 312
Justice Stevens has a long-standing and abiding concern with the propriety of
nonprecedential precedents, the ill-justified unfairness that they invite, and the
departure from our nation‘s historical legal foundations they represent.
B. Justices Scalia and Thomas: Historical Consonance Regarding Precedent
Justice Antonin Scalia seems to hold a similar view of history, though he
has commented less on the unpublication dilemma than Justice Stevens. For
example, while it is not specifically about unpublished opinions, Justice
310. Id. at 899–900 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–78 (1803); James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 290 (1821))
(other citations omitted).
311. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 472–81.
312. Id. at 473 n.2 (internal citations omitted).
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Scalia‘s dissent in Rogers v. Tennessee, discussed above, not only reflects the
originalist constitutional exegesis that he is known for,313 but also parallels the
view of the Framers‘ notions of precedent that underpin Judge Arnold‘s
Anastasoff opinion. 314 Justice Scalia is a self-avowed textualist, one who is
concerned with the text of the document being interpreted, and originalist, one
who is concerned with the meaning given to a text by its authors. 315 As he
describes it, ―[t]he theory of originalism treats a constitution like a statute,
giving the constitution the meaning that its words were understood to bear at
the time they were promulgated.‖316 This form of constitutional interpretation
is fundamental to the argument that nonprecedential opinions exceed the
Framers‘ (and therefore Article III‘s) meaning of ―judicial power.‖317 Justice
Scalia has similarly said, ―[The Constitution] means today not what current
society (much less the Court) thinks it ought to mean, but what it meant when
it was adopted,‖ and ―I look at a text. I take my best shot at getting the fairest
meaning of that text, and where it is a constitutional text, understanding what
it meant at the time it was adopted.‖ 318
Justice Scalia has not spoken directly to the unpublication system, but he
has clearly expressed an interpretation of the concept of ―judicial power‖ that
the argument against nonprecedential opinions rests upon:
If the division of federal powers central to the constitutional
scheme is to succeed in its objective, it seems to me that the

313. See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849
(1989).
314. Compare Rogers, 532 U.S. at 473 n.2, with Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899–900.
315. See Justice Antonin Scalia, A Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, Speech at Catholic
University of America (Oct. 18, 1996) [hereinafter Scalia Theory of Constitutional Interpretation]
(transcript
available
at
http://www.proconservative.net/PCVol5Is225ScaliaTheoryConstl
Interpretation.shtml) (―I belong to a school, a small but hardy school, called ‗textualists‘ or
‗originalists.‘ That school used to be ‗constitutional orthodoxy‘ in the United States.‖); see also
Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in
Washington,
D.C.
(Mar.
14,
2005)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/freedomline/current/guest_commentary/scalia-constitutional-speech.htm)
(―I am one of a small number of judges, small number of anybody—judges, professors, lawyers—
who are known as originalists. Our manner of interpreting the Constitution is to begin with the text,
and to give that text the meaning that it bore when it was adopted by the people. I‘m not a ‗strict
constructionist,‘ despite the introduction. I don‘t like the term ‗strict construction.‘ I do not think the
Constitution, or any text should be interpreted either strictly or sloppily; it should be interpreted
reasonably. Many of my interpretations do not deserve the description ‗strict.‘ I do believe,
however, that you give the text the meaning it had when it was adopted.‖).
316. See Scalia Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 315.
317. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899–904.
318. See Justice Antonin Scalia, Call for Reckoning: God‘s Justice and Ours, Panel Discussion
Before the Pew Center Conference (Jan. 25, 2002) (transcript available at
http://pewforum.org/deathpenalty/resources/transcript3.php).
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fundamental nature of those powers must be preserved as that
nature was understood when the Constitution was enacted.
The Executive, for example, in addition to ―[tak]ing Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed,‖ Art. II, § 3, has no power to
bind private conduct in areas not specifically committed to
his control by Constitution or statute; such a perception of
―[t]he Executive power‖ may be familiar to other legal
systems, but is alien to our own. So also, I think, ―[t]he
judicial Power of the United States‖ conferred upon this
Court and such inferior courts as Congress may establish, Art.
III, § 1, must be deemed to be the judicial power as
understood by our common-law tradition. 319
As the advocates of full precedential value for all cases make a similarly
originalist, due process argument, Justice Scalia may be amenable to an
appeal on that ground as well. 320
Justice Thomas, also an avowed originalist, would seem to approach the
issue of judicial power in a similar manner, 321 but because he has said nothing
on this issue directly, little can be said about Justice Thomas‘s views on the
unpublication system without engaging in presumptuous speculation.
C. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito: Citation Advocates
Unlike Justices Scalia and Thomas, who have rarely, if ever, addressed the
unpublication system directly, the Court‘s two newest Justices, Chief Justice
John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, were both significantly involved with
returning citability to all federal decisions. Both Chief Justice Roberts and
Associate Justice Alito served on the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules during the recent drafting and approval of
FRAP 32.1 on citation of unpublished opinions.322 Both were advocates of a
319. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, Marshall &
Blackmun, JJ., concurring) (alterations in original).
320. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 435–36 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(―The Court‘s opinion establishes that the right of review eliminated by the amendment was a
procedure traditionally accorded at common law. The deprivation of property without observing (or
providing a reasonable substitute for) an important traditional procedure for enforcing stateprescribed limits upon such deprivation violates the Due Process Clause.‖).
321. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian
Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1130 (2008) (describing ―self-proclaimed originalist
Justices Scalia and Thomas‖); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of
Constitutional Common Law, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. P OL‘Y 519, 527 (2008) (describing ―selfprofessed ‗originalists‘ like Justices Thomas and Scalia‖).
322. Justice Alito served on the Committee from 1997 to 2005, serving as its chairman from
2001 to 2005. See Samuel Alito, Responses to Senate Confirmation Questionnaire, available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/Alito_Questionnaire.pdf. Chief Justice Roberts, then a judge on the
D.C. Circuit, was said to be the next in line to chair the committee and a person with a ―personal
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uniform citation rule. 323 Justice Alito, for example, has said of the noncitation
system in the federal courts: ―Such a system cannot be justified.‖ 324 Though
he has expressed concern about how change would be achieved, 325 he has
stated that change is needed: ―I do not think that we should—or that we will
be able to—retain precisely the system we now have.‖ 326 He further
explained, ―[p]rohibiting or limiting citation of unpublished opinions at times
deprives the court of valuable information. . . . More important, allowing
citation of unpublished opinions sends an important message about the nature
of a court‘s unpublished opinions. . . . By allowing citation, a court
recognizes the legitimacy of all of its opinions.‖ 327 Justice Alito was a strong
proponent of the rule regarding citation.328
Justice Alito has also expressed a belief that the issue of precedent would
be best addressed by the Court. In 2002, Justice Alito testified before the
House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property (of the
Committee on the Judiciary):
[T]he question of precedential value, of course, implicates the
doctrine of stare decisis, which has traditionally been
developed by the courts in the course of deciding cases. This
is an area in which there have been some very interesting
developments in recent years. There has been a renewal of
academic interest in the area, there have been some very
interesting and provocative judicial decisions in the area, and
I think it is the overwhelming sentiment of the judiciary that
this development should continue in this manner in the

interest‖ in the unpublished opinion issue. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G.
Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 341 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearing] (in response to a question by
Senator Kohl, ―Well, I am familiar with how the Judicial Conference operates for at least part of its
role. I‘ve been on the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules. I was there as a lawyer and I kept
on as a judge. In fact, I was slated to be the Chairman of that Committee starting in October.‖); Tony
Mauro, Judicial Conference Supports Citing Unpublished Opinions, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1127207112718.
323. Schiltz, supra note 18, at 1475 (―[A]ll of the appellate judges on the Advisory Committee
(including Judges Alito and Roberts) have supported Rule 32.1.‖).
324. Alito Symposium Address, supra note 78, at SAA-01719.
325. Id. at SAA-01715 (noting that while abandoning the published/unpublished distinction
would be ―the preferred option of a great many practitioners and academics,‖ it would be unworkable
without some other systemic change).
326. Id. at SAA-01717.
327. Id. at SAA-01719–20.
328. Id. at SAA-01718 (―The other feature of current practice that I believe must be altered
concerns the issue addressed by proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, the issue
whether lawyers should be allowed to cite ‗unpublished‘ opinions in their briefs.‖).
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common law tradition and should not be regulated by the
national rules process.329
It is apparent that Justice Alito favored lifting the citation ban and believed
the issue of precedent was a rule for the Court rather than the rule-making
body.
In terms of a historical view of the nature of precedent, Justice Alito
relies, as did Justice Roberts in his own confirmation process, on Federalist
No. 78, by Alexander Hamilton:
In all the areas that you mentioned, there is now a
considerable body of case law, and that is a real limitation on
the exercise of judicial power. That is one of the important
reasons for the doctrine of stare decisis. In the 78th
Federalist Paper, when Alexander Hamilton was responding
to the people who were worried about this power of judicial
review, who thought that it would give the judiciary too much
power, he specifically cited the fact that members of the
judiciary would be bound up by precedent and this would
restrain them. This would keep them from injecting their
own views into the decisionmaking process. 330
While Justice Alito holds a view of history consonant with Judge Arnold‘s
Anastasoff opinion and Justice Scalia‘s concurring opinion in James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia,331 it is less clear what opinion he holds regarding
the constitutional issues surrounding nonprecedential opinions.332 Certainly,
he would regard the views of the Framers as a starting point for constitutional
interpretation,333 but no more specific statements by Justice Alito exist.

329. Unpublished Judicial Opinions, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property, 107th Cong. 6 (2002) [hereinafter Alito Unpublished Judicial Opinions].
330. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 526 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Confirmation Hearing].
331. 501 U.S. 529, 548–49 (1991) (Scalia, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
332. Justice Alito recounted a conversation with Judge Richard Arnold on the issue but
expressed only the pragmatic concerns rather than any opinion on the jurisprudential question. Alito
Symposium Address, supra note 78, at SAA-01708–09. Likewise, in advocating for full citation, he
carefully explained that such a citation rule did not mandate that precedential status similar to cases
in the Federal Reporter needed to be granted to unpublished opinions. Id. at SAA-01710–14.
333. Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 330, at 465 (in response to questioning by Senator
Brownback, ―In interpreting the Constitution, I think we should proceed in the way we proceed in
interpreting other important legal authorities. In interpreting statutes, for example, I think we should
look to the text of the Constitution and we should look to the meaning that someone would have
taken from the text of the Constitution at the time of its adoption.‖).

738

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:685

Chief Justice Roberts has similarly stated his approval of the new citation
rule and been more circumspect on the precedent issue. Chief Justice Roberts
has been quoted on the citation issue as saying, ―[a] lawyer ought to be able to
tell a court what it has done,‖ in support of FRAP 32.1.334 In the April 2004
Advisory Committee Meeting, he expressed concern that there was a tension
between the noncitation advocates‘ arguments and the practical and historical
issues of precedent:
Traditionally I think in our adversary system we allow
disputes about the value of citable materials to be resolved by
the lawyers in the exercise of their professional judgment in
the interest of their client and let the judges decide whether
we think that‘s worth anything, whether it‘s an opinion from
another circuit, a district court opinion, a student comment in
a law review. . . . However basic the proposition, in my
professional judgment this is what I want that court to know
on my client‘s behalf and I found it frustrating to have a rule
saying you can‘t do that.335
Justice Roberts, in his confirmation process, affirmed a belief in the
historical underpinnings of the pro-precedent argument. For example, in
responding to questions about the nature of precedent put to him by thenSenator Biden, Justice Roberts responded: ―As Alexander Hamilton explained
in Federalist No. 78: ‗To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents,
which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that
comes before them.‘‖336 He likewise noted that the intent of the Framers was
an important starting place for constitutional analysis. 337 But he rejected
being categorized as an originalist, 338 strict constructionist,339 or any other
label, 340 and neither his confirmation hearings nor prior scholarship or court
opinions touch at all on the unpublished opinion issue.
334. See Mauro, supra note 322.
335. Transcript, Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 52–54 (Apr. 13,
2004), available at http://www.nonpublication.com/aphearing.htm (also using the term ―noncitable
precedent‖ to refer to unpublished opinions).
336. Letter from Judge John Roberts to Sen. Arlen Spector, Senate Judiciary Committee (Sept.
21, 2005), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/judiciary/sh109-158/549-555.pdf
(responses to written questions from then Senator Biden).
337. See Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 322, at 182 (in response to questioning by
Senator Grassley, ―I do think it‘s the—that the Framers‘ intent is the guiding principle that should
apply‖).
338. See id. at 158.
339. See id.
340. See id. (When asked directly by Senator Hatch: ―Some of the philosophies [Cass
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Whether these views by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito translate
to a view that the Constitution compels precedential value of all opinions is
unknown. Part of the difficulty in assessing the predisposition of Justices
Roberts and Alito on the issue of precedent is that, as Advisory Committee
members, they were concerned with the citation rule before them and not the
precedent issue. In educating others and moving toward a uniform citation
rule, the committee was scrupulous in separating the issues of publication,
citation, and precedent. 341 In their positions as circuit judges, they were not in
a position to address the practice, and they have not yet had opportunity on
the Supreme Court to do so.
D. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer: Scholarly and Structural Concerns
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer have both addressed the issue of volume in
the federal courts in their scholarship while serving on the circuit courts.
While Justice Breyer‘s work barely touches on the issue of unpublished
opinions, Justice Ginsburg addresses the issue at some length, finding it to be
―a problematic device.‖342
Justice Ginsburg has made no comment in the form of judicial opinions on
the unpublication system, but her scholarship reveals considerable thought on
the practice. First, in 1983 Justice Ginsburg, then a judge on the D.C. Circuit,
wrote a thoughtful law review article on the establishment of the federal
judiciary under Article III of the Constitution.343 In that piece she examined,
inter alia, the issue of caseload volume and workload in the federal courts. 344
Regarding unpublished opinions, she recognized their usefulness,
―unpublished memoranda are time savers generally reserved for cases
presenting neither a novel issue nor a question of evident significance to

Sunstein‘s recent book] discussed were whether a judge should be an originalist, a strict
constructionist, a fundamentalist, a perfectionist, a majoritarian or a minimalist. Which of those
categories do you fit in?‖ Judge Roberts replied: ―Like most people, I resist the labels. I have told
people when pressed that I prefer to be known as a modest judge, and to me that means some of the
things that you talked about in those other labels. It means an appreciation that the role of the judge
is limited, that a judge is to decide the cases before them, they‘re not to legislate, they‘re not to
execute the laws. Another part of that humility has to do with respect for precedent that forms part of
the rule of law that the judge is obligated to apply under principles of stare decisis.‖).
341. See Alito Unpublished Judicial Opinions, supra note 329, at 5 (―The issue of these
unpublished or ‗non-precedential‘ opinions, as some of us now call them, seems to raise three major
questions. They are related, but I think it is worth trying to keep them separate.‖); Advisory
Committee, supra note 96, at 11 (―[T]his Committee has gone out of its way to avoid expressing a
view on Anastasoff.‖).
342. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of
Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 10 (1983) (internal citations omitted).
343. See generally id.
344. Id. at 7–13.
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persons other than the parties,‖345 but also their downside, ―[e]ven so, the
unpublished decision is a problematic device, for the signed opinion has a
checking function; as former Chief Judge of the First Circuit Frank Coffin
said, a fully articulated written opinion ‗represent[s] some guarantee against
loose thinking, sloppy workmanship, and arbitrariness.‘‖346 In addition, she
noted that the practice of issuing decisions without opinions is not desirable to
litigants: ―My court has a local rule promising an expedited decision if the
parties stipulate to disposition without opinion. I know of no case in which
litigants have invoked the rule.‖347
Similarly, in 1985, Justice Ginsburg discussed her experiences and
thoughts about the federal appellate judiciary in a law review article entitled
The Obligation to Reason Why.348 In that piece, Justice Ginsburg discussed
the keenly felt obligation of the federal appellate judiciary to arrive at correct
and fair conclusions as well as her insider‘s look at how decisions are arrived
at and communicated to the public.349 She again noted the utility of
unpublished memoranda as a tool to deal with the rising tide of cases but
expressed serious concern with their use: ―[t]he unsettling question, to which I
will return, is whether cases resolved by abbreviated disposition are in fact
decided with sufficient care and hard thought.‖350 In addition, she noted: ―A
study of the use of unpublished abbreviated dispositions, sponsored by the
Federal Judicial Center, indicates the need for further attention to this question
by the Judicial Conference of the United States.‖351 Justice Ginsburg
addressed directly the question of ―[h]ow do these dispositions, our practice of
not publishing them, and our rule against citation of unpublished orders as
precedent, measure up against the court‘s obligation to reason why?‖ 352 She
approved of abbreviated dispositions 353 but not dispositions that omit any
345. Id. at 9.
346. Id. at 10.
347. Id.
348. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205 (1985).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 213–14.
351. Id. at 214 n.41 (citing William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of
Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
573, 631 (1981)).
352. Id. at 218.
353. This is perhaps one of the best suggestions for resolving the undeniably high volume of
federal appeals. Somewhere between a full, dissertational opinion and a summary disposition lies an
abbreviated opinion that is signed by specific judges and gives: (1) the holding relevant to the case;
(2) a statement of the prior authority that governs; and (3) a brief statement of the reasoning or facts
that clearly bring this case within the ambit of the prior authority. This shortened opinion need not
set forth the history of the rule, its prior applications, the full chain of reasoning, or other information
that would be included when the court is consciously expanding or retracting the scope of the rule (or
changing the governing rule). If, indeed, cases disposed of by abbreviated opinions are the easy
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reasoning entirely: ―I believe a court of appeals should never release a result
without any stated reason.‖354 The reasoning she would require ―need not be
elaborate,‖ and a simple statement of agreement with the reasoning below or
citation to the circuit or Supreme Court authority would suffice. 355 Regarding
limited publication rules specifically, she again expressed concern, stating
―[a] limited publication rule, however sensible its purpose, is susceptible of
misuse.‖356 The abuse she had in mind was that a judge or panel might ―resort
to an unpublished, abbreviated disposition to conceal or avoid a troublesome
issue.‖357 Her proposed solution to this would be a system that defaults to
publication as well as greater reproduction, indexing, and citation of
unpublished opinions by third parties.358 In this regard, Justice Ginsburg‘s
preferred model has come to pass; ―unpublished‖ appeals court decisions are
now both widely published and citable. Though it cuts against the grain of
her overall concerns with the use of unpublished opinions, she twice in that
article suggested that when a court labels something as ―lacking general
precedential value,‖ it ought to respect that by not citing to such cases itself. 359
She did not say whether decisions so labeled can actually be stripped of their
precedential value or whether simply, having labeled them as of lesser value,
the court ought to respect that. She did call for ―a sensible, even-handed,
uniform system for all of the circuits.‖360 While we now have such a rule
regarding citation, there is still no rule regarding the form and nature of
dispositions nor the precedential value of those opinions.
Finally, in 1990, when writing on the issue of authoring separate opinions,
Justice Ginsburg again noted that publication of opinions provides judicial
accountability and requires judges to test their own thoughts before making
them law.361 Though the discussion of unpublished opinions is not central to
her essay, she emphasized the accountability point:
I betray no confidence when I tell you that unsigned work
products, more often than signed opinions, are fully
composed by hands other than a judge‘s own—by staff
attorneys or law clerks—and let out with scant editing by the

cases, such a statement ought to be feasible. Cf. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 186, at 33–35.
354. Ginsburg, supra note 348, at 221.
355. Id. at 222.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 222–23.
359. Id. at 223.
360. Id.
361. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 139
(1990).
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supervising panel. Judges generally do not labor over
unpublished judgments and memoranda, or even published
per curiam opinions, with the same intensity they devote to
signed opinions. As a bright commentator observed in a
related context: ―When anonymity of pronouncement is
combined with security in office, it is all too easy for the
politically insulated officials to lapse into arrogant ipse
dixits.‖362
Justice Ginsburg‘s writings evince serious concerns about the issuance of
unpublished opinions, particularly in the high percentage of cases left
unpublished. But her concern is more about accountability, thoughtfulness,
and communication by the federal appellate judiciary than about the problem
of nonprecedential precedents or the alleged constitutional infirmities of the
unpublication system. Still, her clear concerns with the system seem to bode
well for those seeking certiorari on the issue of unpublished opinions.
Justice Breyer has not addressed the issue of unpublished opinions but has
discussed the underlying problem of volume in the federal courts. The
volume explosion that gave rise to the unpublication system was also a
driving force behind a reevaluation of the circuit system generally. Various
potential remedies for dealing with growing case loads were examined,
including splitting some of the larger, busier circuits; adding another tier of
appellate review in the federal system; creating a single unified appellate
system; and removing certain classes of cases from general federal (or federal
appellate) jurisdiction. 363 Justice Breyer, then Chief Judge of the First Circuit
Court of Appeals, delivered a lecture on court administration in 1990. 364 In it,
Justice Breyer seemed generally satisfied with the process of tracking cases,
but not into the published/unpublished bins the unpublication system requires.
Instead, he viewed as less important only the cases that were likely to settle,
fail on procedural grounds, be obviated by intervening factual or legal
development, or involve only simple factual questions.365 He also expressed
concern with any greater tracking of cases or relegation of any additional
cases to the lesser track;366 unfortunately, that is exactly what has happened in
the years since 1990.367 And, while Justice Breyer identified the abundance of

362. Id. (internal citations omitted).
363. See generally FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 88.
364. Stephen Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29
(1990).
365. Id. at 32–33.
366. Id. at 43.
367. JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 11, at 52 tbl.S-3 (showing the percent unpublished in the
twelve-month period ending September 30, 2006, to be 84.1%).
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precedents as a problem, as opposed to a lack of precedents that unpublication
opponents would complain of, his predicted solution was not to bar or
suppress some precedents but to create an intermediate tier of appellate courts
to speak with a more unified legal voice. 368 In this regard, Justice Breyer did
not advocate such a structural change, but predicted it: ―I am not advocating a
major structural change at present. . . . Yet, . . . this approach presents a
possible long-range solution to a significantly increased caseload and, unless
the caseload stops growing, this is what will happen eventually.‖369
Justice Breyer‘s thoughtful discussion prefers some means to address the
volume issue over others, specifically greater case management, promotion of
alternative dispute resolution, and efficient case management, but he
ultimately concluded that ―a circuit court of appeals can do very little on its
own.‖370 Whether the recognition of the need for both local and global
solutions to the volume problem translates into a willingness to hear and strike
down the present unpublication system seems uncertain. This focus on
administration and pragmatism suggests an unwillingness to strike down the
present system without an adequate replacement, but perhaps now that he is
Justice Breyer, he would be willing to issue a constitutional interpretation
without regard to the administrative concern that was his focus as Chief Judge
of the First Circuit. This single comment by Justice Breyer seems too little to
support much reasoned prediction about his opinion on the unpublication
system.
E. Justices Kennedy and Souter: Silent on the Issue
Finally, Justices Anthony Kennedy and David Souter seem to have
remained almost entirely silent on the issue of unpublished opinions. Not a
single comment has been found in any separate concurrence or dissent nor any
piece of scholarship or even any media comment.
The only public comment tying Justice Kennedy to the issue of the recent
citation discussion is a hearsay comment recounted by noncitation opponent
Michael Schmier: ―‗When Justice Anthony Kennedy was here for a speech,
my brother and I went up to him to talk about this and he got very angry at
us,‘ Mr. Schmier said, quoting the former Californian as replying, ‗If you
guys want us to do it right, we‘d need 1,000 more judges.‘‖ 371 Given the
368. Breyer, supra note 364, at 40–42.
369. Id. at 42.
370. Id. at 48.
371. Frank J. Murray, Justices to Review Access to Opinions, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2000, at
A8, available at http://famguardian.org/Subjects/LawAndGovt/LegalEthics/Nonpublication/Press/
MURRAY.htm (quoting Michael Schmier, advocate of lifting nonpublication rules, specifically in
California, and petitioner in Schmier v. Supreme Court of California, 531 U.S. 958 (2000) (denying
certiorari), which despite the title of the article was not reviewed—the high Court denied certiorari).
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second-hand nature of this comment as well as the lack of context as to the
system being discussed little can be inferred about Justice Kennedy‘s opinion
on the issue of precedent of unpublished opinions.
Regarding Justice Souter, there is even less. He did sign on to a dissent to
denial of certiorari authored by Justice Blackmun, also signed by Justice
O‘Connor, stating: ―The fact that the Court of Appeals‘ opinion is
unpublished is irrelevant. Nonpublication must not be a convenient means to
prevent review. An unpublished opinion may have a lingering effect in the
Circuit and surely is as important to the parties concerned as is a published
opinion.‖372 Of course, Justice Souter has elected to step down from the Court
following the 2008-2009 Term. 373 His recently nominated, and likely to be
appointed, replacement, Judge Sonia Sotomayor, has an equally unknown
opinion on the issue of unpublished opinions and precedent. 374 Nothing in her
writings or public comments reveal an opinion on this issue. If the next
Supreme Court Justice is other than Sonia Sotomayor, his or her views on
unpublished opinions may be as inscrutable as those of Souter and Sotomayor
or as well-established as those of Justice Stevens. Only time will tell what
predisposition, if any, our new ninth Justice will have on this issue.
In sum, the separate statements by the sitting Supreme Court Justices
illustrate a varying degree of interest in the issue and concern with the system.
Justice Stevens is plainly and steadfastly disapproving of the entire
unpublication system. Justice Ginsburg shares those grave concerns, though
her writings paint her as less concerned with the precedent aspect of the
debate. Justice Scalia and probably Justice Thomas support the originalist
interpretation of our Framers‘ views on precedent inherent in Article III.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have both been outspoken advocates
of the pro-citation rule, FRAP 32.1, and have expressed general concerns
about the unpublication system. Justices Breyer, Souter, and Kennedy have
made only passing references, if any, to the issue. While none of this evinces
a clear willingness to rule, as Judge Richard Arnold did in Anastasoff, that
circuit nonpublication rules violate the Constitution, or that such rules violate
equal protection or due process, they at least suggest a willingness on the part
of a majority of the Court to examine the issue.
372. Smith v. United States, 502 U.S. 1017, 1020 n.* (1991) (mem.) (Blackmun, O‘Connor &
Souter, JJ., dissenting).
373. Letter from Supreme Court Justice David H. Souter to President Barack H. Obama (May
1, 2009), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/press/DHSLetter.pdf; see also Nina
Totenberg, Supreme Court Justice Souter to Retire, NAT‘L PUBLIC RADIO, Apr. 30, 2009, available
at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103694193.
374. Ben Feller, Historic Nomination: Hispanic Sotomayor as Justice, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
May 27, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/26/
AR2009052600881.html.

2009]

ENDING THE UNPUBLICATION SYSTEM

745

VI. CONCLUSION
The tripartite unpublication system has fallen apart. Cases were
unpublished to save time and costs and then declared noncitable to deny the
market for them and, finally, they were declared nonprecedential by relying
on ―the correspondence of publication and precedential value on the one hand,
and of non-publication and non-precedent value on the other hand.‖375 This
―morass of jurisprudence‖—a justification for denying precedent to cases for
the first time in common law history—was never examined by the 1973
Committee nor by any authority promulgating the precedent-denying rules.
Despite numerous petitions for certiorari, the Supreme Court has never
reviewed the issue. Any petition for certiorari faces an uphill battle given the
numerous petitions and few grants of certiorari. Still, several Justices have
expressed concern with the unpublication system and support for the historical
and constitutional arguments opponents of that system rely upon. While
certiorari, and ultimately a constitutional ruling, are improbable, such claims
ought to be pursued.376 The only remaining piece of the unpublication
system—denial of precedent—is unjustified and improper.
Whatever
adjustment the federal judiciary must make in the wake of such a decision,
principle demands an end to the practice. The time has come to drain the
morass of jurisprudence avoided by past policymakers and set a better
foundation for the future of the American federal common law system.

375. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 1, at 21.
376. In the Court‘s only grant of certiorari on a case raising this issue, Browder, it left open the
question for another day. Browder v. Dir., Dept. of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 258 n.1 (1978)
(―Finally, petitioner questioned the validity of the Seventh Circuit‘s ‗unpublished opinion‘ rule. We
leave these questions to another day.‖). Hopefully, that day is not too far off.

